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Fair Use For Free, or Permitted-but-Paid?
Jane C. Ginsburg, Columbia University School of Law *
Forthcoming, Berkeley Technology Law Journal
Abstract
Fair use is an on/off switch: Either the challenged use is an infringement
of copyright, or it is a fair use, which Section 107 declares “is not an
infringement of copyright.” As a result, either the copyright owner can
stop the use, or the user not only is dispensed from obtaining permission,
but also owes no compensation for the use. The unpaid nature of fair use
introduces pressures that may distort analysis, particularly of the
“transformative” character of the use, and of potential market harm.
Faced with a use, particularly in the context of new technologies, that a
court perceives to be socially beneficial, a court may overemphasize its
“transformativeness,” and correspondingly underestimate the market
consequences, in order to prevent the copyright owner from frustrating the
social benefit. Distortions can appear in the other direction as well: A
court sensitive to the economic consequences of the unpaid use may feel
obliged to downplay the public interest fostered by the use. Statutory
licenses or privately negotiated accords within a statutory framework can
alleviate the tension, by ensuring that uses that the legislator perceives to
be in the public interest proceed free of the copyright owner’s veto, but
with compensation – in other words, “Permitted but Paid.”
The United States is an outlier in the broader international landscape of
copyright exceptions. The copyright laws of EU member states, Canada,
Australia, and New Zealand do not include an all-purpose fair use defense
(though one has been proposed in Australia), but all these states have
enacted a panoply of copyright exceptions, many of which require
remuneration. Thus, while our fair use doctrine confronts courts with an
all-or-nothing choice, other countries have charted middle courses
between barring the use and permitting its unremunerated pursuit.
In contending that some uses previously ruled “fair” should not remain
unpaid, I argue that the copyright law should distinguish new distributions
*

Many thanks for research assistance to Trey Brewer, Arjun Jaikumar and Olena
Ripnick, all Columbia Law School class of 2014. Thanks also for observations and
criticisms to June Besek, Jack Browning, Irene Calboli, David Carson, Jacqueline
Charlesworth, Susy Frankel, Wendy Gordon, Brad Greenberg, Lital Helman, Yafit LevAretz, Jessica Litman, Tony Reese, Paul Spera, Eva Subotnik and Edouard Treppoz, and
to Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Christopher Yoo and the participants in the University of
Pennsylvania copyright colloquium; to Jennifer Rothman and Jay Dougherty and the
participants in the Loyola LA law school faculty workshop, and to my colleagues at the
Columbia Law School faculty workshop. Much gratitude to Barton Beebe for sharing his
database of fair use cases.
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from new works, and should confine (free) “fair use” to the latter. I
propose that many redistributive uses be “Permitted but Paid,” and be
subject to a statutory framework for license negotiations, with compulsory
licensing as a backstop. “Permitted but Paid” uses may be divided into
two classes: Subsidy (socially worthy redistributions); and Market Failure
(transactions costs are too high to warrant a licensing solution; or a new
mode of dissemination – infant industry – is threatened by copyright
owner recalcitrance). Because the inclusion of a use within the Market
Failure class turns largely on facts that may evolve, these uses’
classification as “Permitted but Paid” should be subject to a phase-out, for
example, a renewable sunset following a five-year review by the
Copyright Office.
Where the use confers a public benefit and the choice is all-or-nothing, a
fair use outcome is assured. But were “Permitted but Paid” an option, we
would not be lured by a dichotomy falsely pitting authors against a
perceived social good: The licensing mechanism would allow both
broader dissemination and provide payment to authors. One might rejoin
that there is no need to license if the use is fair. But if the use is “fair”
because it supposedly cannot reasonably be licensed, then “Permitted but
Paid” should replace fair use for free.
Introduction
The Supreme Court in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City
Studios fended a fork in the fair use road. It was the first case, apart from
the Court of Claims decision a decade earlier in Williams & Wilkins v.
U.S.,2 to hold that copying an entire work for the same purpose as the
original, i.e., with no additional authorship contribution, could be a fair
use, and therefore “free” in both senses of the word. Prior fair use cases
concerned new creativity; fair use developed in the context of what had
been called “productive use”3 to enable new expression, not new
distribution.
1

In prior controversies involving new modes of dissemination,
courts wary of copyright owner motives (to enforce copyright in order to
put a new entrant out of business) interpreted the scope of exclusive rights

1

Sony Corp of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984)
487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aff’d by an equally divided Court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975).
3
See Sony Corp of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 478 (1984)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting that commonly recognized examples of fair use
“reflect[] a common theme: each is a productive use, resulting in some added benefit to
the public beyond that produced by the first autor’s work”).
2

2

narrowly to find no prima facie infringement.4 By contrast, copying and
retention of an entire work seem clearly to give rise to a prima facie claim
of infringement.5 Fair use therefore affords the remaining safety valve.
The social or technological pressure that courts may sense to permit the
use may contribute to the notorious unpredictability of fair use in the U.S.6
Of course, any rule that privileges flexibility necessarily produces
unpredictability. The greater the former, the greater also the latter.
But there may be an additional reason. Fair use is an on/off
switch: all or nothing. Either the challenged use is an infringement of
copyright, or it is a fair use, which section 107 declares “is not an
infringement of copyright.”7 As a result, either the copyright owner can
stop the use,8 or the user not only is dispensed from obtaining permission,
but also owes no compensation for the use. The unpaid nature of fair use
introduces pressures that may distort analysis, particularly of the
“transformative” character of the use,9 and of potential market harm.
Faced with a use, particularly in the context of new technologies, that a
court perceives to be socially beneficial, a court may overemphasize its
“transformativeness,” and correspondingly underestimate the market
4

See, e.g., White-Smith v. Apollo, 209 U.S. 1, 18 (1908) (piano roll not a “copy” and
therefore no violation of reproduction right); Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists
Television, 392 U.S. 398--402 (1968) (antenna television retransmissions are not public
performances as a matter of law); Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System,
Inc., 415 U.S. 394 (1974) (cable retransmissions held not public performances).
5
Though one might dispute who makes the copy, e.g., Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v.
CSC Holdings, 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008); Fox Broadcasting Corp. v. Dish Network
L.L.C., 723 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2013).
6
Laments about the indeterminacy and unpredictability of fair use are legion, see, e.g.,
Paul Goldstein, Goldstein on Copyright §12.1 (2013); Shyamkrishna Balganesh,
Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 1569 (2009); James Gibson,
Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116 Yale L. J. 882 at
889 (2007); David Nimmer, “Fairest of them All” And Other Fairy Tales of Fair Use,” 66
L. & Contemp. Probs. 263, 287 (2003); Pierre N. Leval, Towards a Fair Use Standard,
103 Harv. L. Rev. 1105, 1106 (1990). Contra (fair use in practice is not so unpredictable),
e.g., Matthew Sag, Predicting Fair Use, 73 Ohio St. L.J. 47 (2012); Pamela Samuelson,
Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 Fordham L. Rev. 2537 (2009). Most of the examples discussed
in these articles, however, concern new creativity rather than new distribution.
7
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012) (“[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work . . . is not an
infringement of copyright.”).
8
But see suggestions, in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. 569, 578 n. 10 (1993) and
Stewart v. Abend, 863 F.2d 1465, 1479 (9th Cir. 1988), aff’d, 495 U.S. 207 (1990), that
the appropriate remedy may be monetary, in effect, judicially imposed compulsory
licenses; the defendants in those cases, however, produced new works of authorship, they
did not merely redistribute the underlying work as is.
9
Recent fair use case law suggests that once the use is deemed “transformative” it
becomes presumptively “fair.” See infra notes 53—59 and accompanying text (discussing
domination of “transformative” finding in fair use analysis); see also, e.g., Neri v Monroe
11-cv-429-slc (W.D. Wisc. Feb. 26, 2014).
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consequences, in order to prevent the copyright owner from frustrating the
social benefit.10 Distortions can appear in the other direction as well: A
court sensitive to the economic consequences of the unpaid use may feel
obliged to downplay the public interest fostered by the use.11 Statutory
licenses or privately-negotiated accords within a statutory framework can
alleviate the tension, by ensuring that uses which the legislator perceives
to be in the public interest proceed free of the copyright owner’s veto, but
with compensation.
In contending that some uses previously ruled “fair” should not
remain unpaid, I argue that the copyright law should distinguish new
distributions from new works, and should confine (free) “fair use” to the
latter. (I deliberately avoid the term “transformative,” which I believe has
obscured analysis ever since courts began to attach that label to “uses” unmoored
from “works.”) Exploitations within the former group would fall into a

new category, “Permitted but Paid,” or would be ruled infringing, and
therefore left to resolution in the marketplace.
This project does not propose any change to the analysis of fair use
cases involving new creativity.12 Analytical difficulties may abound there
as well (for example, how much copying is too much; where lies the line
between a fair use parody and an infringing derivative work), but they
arise in the strongest normative universe for free use.13 The situations I
intend to address often come down to assessing whether a new use should
be exempted from copyright liability in order to enable a new business
model, or to ensure relatively inexpensive dissemination in furtherance of
socially worthy goals such as non-profit education. The normative claims
underlying redistributive uses are not based on authorship, but rather on
“information policy,” a notion which may cover both the interests of

10

E.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc. 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007); Kelly v.
Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003); Perfect 10 v. Yandex, 2013 WL
1899851 (N.D. Cal. 2013)
11
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 416 F.Supp.2d 828 (C.D.Cal. 2006), rev’d in part,
Amazon, 508 F.3d 1146
12
Although, were I reforming what I’ll call “true” fair use, I would make authorship
attribution a factor in assessing---if not a prerequisite to---fair use. Cf. Berne Convention
for the protection of literary and artistic works, arts. 10 and 10bis (requiring authorship
attribution for quotation and similar exceptions)
13
But cf. Hon. J. Alex Kozinski & Christopher Newman, What’s So Fair About Fair
Use? The 1999 Donald C. Brace Memorial Lecture, 46 J. Copyright Soc’y 512 (1999)
(urging that the derivative works right be replaced by compulsory licensing).
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readers in receiving works of authorship14 and of new distributors in
purveying them.
“Permitted but Paid” uses may be divided into two classes:
Subsidy (socially worthy redistributions); and Market Failure (transactions
costs are too high to warrant a licensing solution; or a new mode of
dissemination – infant industry – is threatened by copyright owner
recalcitrance). Because the latter class turns largely on facts which may
evolve (the industry may grow up; licensing mechanisms may evolve),
these uses’ classification as “Permitted but Paid” should be subject to a
phase-out,15 for example, a renewable sunset following a five-year review
by the Copyright Office.
I recognize that my categories present a variety of line-drawing
challenges. First, some would dispute my initial distinction between new
authorship (true) fair use, and Subsidy or Market Failure “fair” use.16 That
dispute probably derives from different normative visions of the value of
creating new expression as opposed to receiving or reiterating extant
expression. As a result, I note the disagreement, but move on. Second,
the Subsidy and Market Failure categories may overlap as transaction
costs may also characterize some of the kinds of uses I have characterized
as subsidies, and social benefit may buttress the appeal of the transactions
cost justification for a permitted use. Nonetheless, I believe the categories
are distinct, because there may be social policy reasons to continue to
subsidize a use even if the transactions cost problem could be overcome.
Finally, there is another boundary issue: Permitted-but-paid must be
cabined so that it avoids the slippery slide into two opposite extremes. On
the one hand, my proposal should not lead to turning all of copyright law
14

See, e.g,, Jessica Litman, Readers’ Copyright, 58 J. Copyright Soc’y 325 (2011);
Wendy Gordon, Fair Use Markets: On Weighing Potential License Fees, 79 Geo. Wash.
L. Rev. 1814 (2011).
15
Thanks to Lital Helman for inspiring this solution. Sunset provisions are not unknown
in U.S. Copyright law, see. e.g., See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 119, 601.
One might envision a third class of “fair use for others”: copying, (possibly
intermediate copying) to enable others to engage in creative uses of others’ works. But
the claims of for-profit fair use enablers may often fall in the class of market failure
permitted-but-paid uses, particularly if the enablers are compiling large databases of
copyrighted works in order to facilitate, for example, data mining. As a general
proposition, courts have not embraced profit-making “fair use for others.” See, e.g.,
Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996); Basic
Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1547 (rejecting fair use
defense for for-profit maker of university coursepacks).
16
See, e.g, Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free
Speech and How Copying Serves It, 114 Yale L.J. 535 (2004); Wendy Gordon, Fair Use
as Market Failure, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 1600 (1982).
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into a “liability rule”; on the other, it should not promote the conclusion
that any use that can be paid for should be compensated (if not controlled).
The study proceeds as follows. I first examine the evolution of the
two classes of new distribution fair use cases. As examples of social
subsidies, I consider the treatment of educational copying from the
legislative history of the 1976 Copyright Act through Cambridge
University Press v Becker (the Georgia State online “reserves”
controversy),17 and then turn to library copying and the Hathi Trust case.
Market failure cases encompass a range of examples of mass use of
copyright works, from private copying to mass digitization (e.g. Google
Books), to search engines.
The next part of this study looks to Europe, Australia, New
Zealand and Canada. These copyright regimes have typically provided
compensation schemes for many of the non-creative uses surveyed here.
The United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand have also established or
are considering instituting “license it or lose it” systems to promote
socially beneficial redistributions of copyrighted works. Some European
countries have, moreover, addressed market failure problems through
“extended collective licensing” systems that merge features of statutory
licenses and private ordering.
Finally, I consider how to implement “Permitted but Paid” in the
U.S. As an initial matter, I inquire whether, subsequent to the Supreme
Court’s decision in eBay v. MercExchange,18 the tightened conditions for
issuing preliminary and permanent injunctions are resulting in a de facto
Permitted but Paid regime. If the usual panoply of copyright remedies
nonetheless largely remains available, can the shadow of injunctive relief
stimulate private ordering? Can judges provide the impetus to private
ordering by making fair use the backstop to a “license it or lose it”
regime? Or is legislation needed to enable private ordering, for example,
by lessening antitrust constraints? If legislation is a necessary adjunct to
private ordering, who will set the backdrop royalty rates, and how will the
17

Another type of non-creative use of entire works (not analyzed here) is evidentiary use,
for example submission of copies of third-party works in court proceedings, see, e.g.,
Scott v. WorldStarHipHop, Inc., 2011 WL 5082410 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2011); Shell v.
City of Radford, Virginia, 351 F. Supp. 2d 510, 513 (W.D. Va. 2005), or as evidence of
prior art in patent applications, see, AIP v Schwegman, Lundberg & Woessner
(Magistrate, D. Minn 2013). NOTE TO BTLJ EDITORS: An 11th Cir decision in the
Georgia State case is pending, and may require revising the relevant parts of this
article.
18
547 U.S. 388 (2006)
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rates be determined? I suggest that the Copyright Royalty Board might
assume that task of rate-setting if the parties cannot agree, but that it
should apply the method of last best offer arbitration (“baseball
arbitration”) to arrive at the rate.

I

The evolution of redistribution fair use

U.S. copyright law has long recognized fair use as an exception
favoring new creativity.19 Justice Story’s 1841 decision in Folsom v.
Marsh,20 to which many assign the doctrine’s ancestor attribution,21
refined the British rule of “fair abridgement”22 to emphasize the
authorship contributions of the alleged infringer, as well as their impact on
the market for the copied work. Justice Story distinguished between “real,
substantial condensation of the materials, and intellectual labor and
judgment bestowed thereon” and “merely the facile use of the scissors; or
extracts of the essential parts, constituting the chief value of the original
work.”23 The ensuing century and a half of fair use cases almost
19

The doctrinal roots of the fair use exception for new creativity can be traced back to the
1841 Supreme Court opinion in Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841),
discussed infra notes 20--23 and accompanying text. “New creativity fair use” cases still
outnumber “redistribution fair use” cases on today’s dockets. For an illustrative but far
from exhaustive list of modern “new creativity fair use” cases, see, for example,
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994) (deciding whether commercial
parody of Roy Orbison’s song “Oh, Pretty Woman” by 2 Live Crew was fair use); Cariou
v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013) (appropriation art); Bill Graham Archives v.
Dorling Kindersley Limited, 448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 2006) (reproduction of seven posters
in biography of the band the Grateful Dead); Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244 (2d Cir.
2006) (painting that adapted images from photograph); Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures
Corp., 137 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 1998) (parody of Vanity Fair cover photograph) .
20
9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841).
21
See, e.g., Campbell, 510 U.S. at 575. See generally, R. Anthony Reese, The Story of
Folsom v. Marsh: Distinguishing Between Infringing and Legitimate Uses, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES, at 259 (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Jane C.
Ginsburg, eds. 2005).
22
Epitomized in decisions such as Gyles v. Wilcox, 26 Eng. Rep. 489, 2 Atk. 141 (1740)
and Sayre v Moore, 102 Eng. Rep. 139 n.(b), 1 East 361 n.(b) (1785). On the role of “fair
abridgement” in promoting new creativity, see, e.g., Isabella Alexander, Copyright and
the Public Interest in the Nineteenth Century 170—72 (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010).
On fair abridgement as a precursor to fair use, see, e.g., Matthew Sag, The Prehistory of
Fair Use, 76 Brook. L. Rev. 1371 (2011)
23
9 F.Cas. at 345. Although in that case Judge Story found the use of the work (George
Washington’s letters) to be infringing, notably because the letters constituted over 1/3 of
defendant’s work and “impart[ed] to it . . . its essential value,” id at 349, he nonetheless
praised the defendant’s objective of producing works for school libraries, and expressed
the hope that the parties might come to an “amicable settlement,” id. Folsom v. Marsh
might thus be seen as a precursor to the social subsidy variant of Permitted but Paid;
thanks for this point to Eva Subotnick.
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exclusively debated the nature of the second author’s additions or
alterations, pitted against the first author or copyright owner’s prospects
for exploiting the work.24 The caselaw thus calibrated the basic moving
parts of the traditional fair use doctrine: authorship, public benefit,
economic impact. The progress of learning25 advances when the law
allows follow-on authors to bestow their intellectual labor and judgment in
reworking selections from a prior work, without prejudicing the profits or
prospects of that work.
Redistribution “fair uses” are different. They do not directly
produce new works. (I recognize that consumption-directed uses may
enrich the end user’s knowledge and reflections in ways that ultimately
inform some subsequent creative endeavor,26 but the same might be said
of everything, from works of authorship to cups of coffee, that becomes an
“input” in a prospective author’s creative process.) What motivations
therefore underlie non authorship-based exceptions? The caselaw and
legislative history of the 1976 Copyright Act indicate two broad
impetuses. First, the category I have, perhaps provocatively, called
“subsidy,”27 in which redistributive copying for non-commercial purposes
(generally by educational institutions or libraries) receives a free pass
(subject to a variety of limitations). (I recognize that those who reject the
characterization of copyright as a “property right” will similarly contest
the proposition that fair use effectively requires authors to underwrite free
uses in the public interest.) Second, and primarily in the case of
redistributive uses developed by new (generally commercial) market
entrants, “market failure” may justify both those uses that are as a
practical matter insusceptible to licensing, notably because of their
volume, and (more controversially) those whose licensing may be possible

24
See, e.g., cases cited supra, note 19. See also Columbia Broadcasting Inc. v. Loew’s,
Inc., 356 U.S. 43 (1958); Benny v. Loew’s Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956); Shapiro,
Bernstein & Co. v. P.F. Collier & Son Co., 26 U.S.P.Q. 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1934). For an
analysis of courts’ application of fair use under the 1909 Copyright Act, see Alan
Latman, Study No. 14: Fair Use of Copyrighted Works, in II Studies on Copyright:
Arthur Fisher Memorial Edition 781, 783—93 (Copyright Soc’y of U.S.A. eds,).
25
See U.S. Const., Art. I. sec. 8, cl. 8 (“Congress shall have power . . . to promote the
progress of science . . .); Rosemont Ents. v. Random House 366 F.2d 303, 307—311
(1966) (applying fair use when enforcement of copyright, by rightowner who sought to
suppress information, would frustrate the progress of science).
26
Thanks to Wendy Gordon for this observation.
27
But not as provocatively as, for example, Rob Merges, who has suggested that fair use
across the board obliges authors to subsidize user-beneficiaries. See Robert Merges, The
End of Friction? Property Rights In The "Newtonian" World Of Online Commerce, 12
Berkeley Tech. L.J. 115, 115--16 (1997).
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but whose licensors are unreasonably intractable.28
Perhaps not
surprisingly, courts do not generally announce the latter basis, since it both
implies second-guessing of business decisions and ascribes sinister
motivations to the refusal to license. As a result, those who invoke this
justification do not often succeed.29 Nonetheless, I believe it underlies
some fair use decisions, notably the Ninth Circuit’s recent holding in
DISH Networks,30 whose fair use analysis (like the cursory and resultoriented fair use analysis in the Supreme Court's Sony decision31 on which
it relies) is otherwise unconvincing, at best.
The following discussion considers some examples of the two
kinds of redistributive “fair uses.”
A.

Social subsidy fair use

1.

Non profit educational uses

a.

photocopying and the 1976 Act

Section 107(1) identifies "nonprofit educational purposes" as a use
whose “nature and purpose” favor a finding of fair use.32 The preamble to
section 107 lists among the uses which in general exemplify fair use (but
which courts must in each case examine) “teaching (including multiple
copies for classroom use).” 33 Thus, as the Supreme Court has recognized,
28

A great deal has been written on “market failure” fair use since Wendy Gordon’s
seminal 1982 article in the Columbia Law Review. See, e.g., Jennifer M. Urban, How
Fair Use Can Solve the Orphan Works Problem, 27 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1379 (2012);
Edward Lee, Technological Fair Use, 83 S. Cal. L. Rev. 797 (2010); Alan L. Durham,
Consumer Modification of Copyrighted Works, 81 Ind. L.J. 851 (2006); David M.
Driesen & Shubha Ghosh , The Functions of Transaction Costs: Rethinking Transaction
Cost Minimization in a World of Friction, 47 Ariz. L. Rev. 61 (2005); Maureen A.
O’Rourke, Towards a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 1177
(2000); Tom W. Bell, Fair Use vs. Fared Use: The Impact of Automated Rights
Management on Copyright’s Fair Use Doctrine, 76 N.C. L. Rev. 557 (1998); Julie E.
Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of Rights Management,
97 Mich. L. Rev. 462 (1998); Robert Merges, The End of Friction, supra; Neil Weinstock
Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 Yale L.J. 283 (1996).
29
See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); UMG
Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.Com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 352 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (rejecting
defendant’s contention that MP3 storage product was fair use because plaintiff failed to
show that licensing in this area was not “‘traditional, reasonable, or likely to be
developed’” (quoting Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 930 (2d Cir.
1994)). Cf. Texaco, 60 F.3d at 930--31 (rejecting market failure argument on grounds
that market failure no longer existed due to emerging licensing market).
30
Fox Broad. Co., Inc. v. Dish Network L.L.C., 723 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2013).
31
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
32
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
33
Id.
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the 1976 Act specifies one form of use that does not involve new
creativity,34 though the contours of this redistributive use remain
undefined, and the inclusion of a use in the preamble does not confer a
presumption of “fair-ness”. Educational photocopying was in fact one of
the most contested issues during the legislative process leading up to the
1976 Act.35 The “Agreement on Guidelines for Classroom Copying in
Not-for-Profit Educational Institutions With Respect to Books and
Periodicals”36 that emerged from this process offers some indication of
Congress’ intention regarding the scope of fair use.
I do not wish to overemphasize the inferences to draw from the
Guidelines, in part because they are highly contested,37 and because by
their own terms, they identify a minimum threshold, in effect a safe
harbor, thus leaving open the possibility of more extensive permissible
free use.38 But several features of the Guidelines suggest that they focus
on the acts of individual teachers. For example, in addition to a “brevity”
component, the Guidelines specify “spontaneity” (“the inspiration and
decision to use the work and the moment of its use for maximum teaching
effectiveness are so close in time that it would be unreasonable to expect a
timely reply to a request for permission”); they limit multiple copying to
no more than nine instances during a term, and perhaps most significantly,
with respect to the intended beneficiary, “the copying of the material is for
only one course in the school in which the copies are made.” One may
therefore query whether systematic copying, particularly of substantial

34

See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 579, n.11. (“The obvious statutory exception
to this focus on transformative uses is the straight reproduction of multiple copies for
classroom distribution.”)
35
See, e.g., Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72
Cornell L. Rev. 857, 865-67 (1987).
36
H.R. Rep. No. 1476 at 68-71, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
37
Compare, Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381,
1390-91 (6th Cir. 1996) (Guidelines provide useful guidance), with Cambridge U. Press
v. Becker, 863 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1227-29 (N.D. Ga. 2012) (criticizing Guidelines’
legitimacy). For academic commentary critical of the Guidelines, see, e.g., Jennifer
Rothman, Reconsidering Best Practices In the Context of Fair Use and Copyright Law,
57 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 371 (2010); Litman, supra note 11; Kenneth D. Crews, The Law
of Fair Use and the Illusion of Fair Use Guidelines, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 599 (2001); Gregory
K. Klingsporn, CONFU And the Future of Fair Use Guidelines, 23 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS
101 (1999); Carol Silberberg, Note, Preserving Educational Fair Use in the Twenty-First
Century 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 617 (2001)
38
H.R. REP. No. 94-1476 at 68 ("[T]he following statement of guidelines is not intended
to limit the types of copying permitted under the standards of fair use under judicial
decision and which are stated in Section 107 of the Copyright Revision Bill. There may
be instances in which copying which does not fall within the guidelines stated below may
nonetheless be permitted under the criteria of fair use.")
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course materials,39 by the educational institution, falls so far outside the
Guidelines’ ambit as to exceed even the Guidelines’ undefined additional
breathing space.
By the same token, the report of the Senate Judiciary Committee
casts doubt on the application of fair use to institutional educational
copying. The Committee surmised: “The fair use doctrine in the case of
classroom copying would apply primarily to the situation of a teacher
who, acting individually and at his own volition, makes one or more
copies for temporary use by himself or his pupils in the classroom. A
different result is indicated where the copying was done by the educational
institution, school system, or larger unit or where copying was required or
suggested by the school administration, either in special instances or as
part of a general plan.”40
Educational institutions, however, have not been the defendants in
most of the cases involving educational copying. Although publishers
sued New York University in the early 1980s over its systematic
preparation of coursepacks, the case settled.41 The other photocopying
decisions involved commercial actors,42 thus considerably attenuating the
“public benefit” conferred by the unauthorized preparation of coursepacks.
A decision rendered shortly after the enactment of the 1976 Act,
Encyclopedia Britannica v Crooks,43 however, did involve educational
copying (videotaping, not photocopying) by institutional defendants, but
the facts of the case did not favor the application of fair use to
institutional-level non-profit educational copying. There, the producers of
educational videos charged that defendant school districts comprising over
100 schools videotaped television broadcasts of their works, built a library
of these videotaped works, and made copies of these tapes for classroom
use. Because educational institutions constituted the principal market for
the plaintiffs’ works, the school districts’ systematic copying substituted
39

The Guidelines also state: “Copying shall not be used to create or to replace or
substitute for anthologies, compilations or collective works.”
40
S. Rep. No. 94-473, at 63 (1976).
41
The case, Addison-Wesley Publishing Co. v. New York University, settled “on terms
which included the incorporation of the Classroom Guidelines into the University’s
official photocopying policies.” Bernard Zidar, Comment, Fair Use and the Code of the
Schoolyard: Can Copyshops Compile Coursepacks Consistent with Copyright?, 46
Emory L.J. 1363, 1377 (1997) (outlining history of Addison and other early
photocopying cases).
42
See Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381, 1389 (6th Cir.
1996); Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d. 913, 922 (2d. Cir. 1994); Basic
Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp., 758 F.Supp. 1522, 1532 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
43
542 F. Supp. 1156 (W.D.N.Y. 1982).
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for purchases of the programs. The economic impact exceeded reasonable
fair use tolerance even for publicly beneficial goals.
More recently, however, a district court has found fair use in a case
involving institutional-level creation of “electronic reserves,” arguably the
digital era equivalent of photocopied coursepacks.
b.

Digital Copying

In Cambridge University Press v Becker,44 three academic
publishers contended that Georgia State University systematically
infringed their copyrights by adopting a policy that permitted faculty
members to make excerpts from the plaintiffs’ works as electronic course
reserves through the university library’s website. The university’s 2009
Copyright Policy allegedly “led to continuing abuse of the fair use
privilege” by “mak[ing] professors responsible for determining whether a
particular use is a fair use” and requiring the professor to complete a “fair
use checklist” to do so.
The plaintiffs identified 75 instances of
alleged infringement during the three full semesters after the Copyright
Policy was adopted. Faculty members had assigned the excerpts at issue as
supplemental (but often required) reading in graduate or upper-level
undergraduate courses in language or social science. The books from
which the excerpts came were generally not textbooks, but rather singleauthor monographs or edited collections of multiple chapters by a variety
of authors. The “great majority” of the excerpts at issue constituted “a
chapter or less from a multi-chapter book.” The average copied excerpt
constituted about 10% of the book from which it was copied “(though
some were considerably more and some were considerably less)”.
Excerpts placed on electronic reserve were available by password only to
students enrolled in the course, and only during the semester in which the
student was enrolled, but students could create permanent retention copies
by downloading or printing the reserve readings for their courses.
Following a bench trial, the court found most of the copying to be
fair use. Evaluating “the purpose and the character of the use,” the court
44

863 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1201 (N.D. Ga. 2012). While I have classified coursepacks and
electronic reserves as forms of reiterative copying, one might contend that the selection
of excerpts to copy results in a kind of anthology, which might be considered not merely
a new use but a new work. That there may be some authorship component to the
selection of materials to copy does not compel such a recharacterization. The Georgia
State court did not consider the copying at issue to be “transformative”. Id. at 1232
(“Taking into account the fact that this case involves only mirror-image,
nontransformative uses . . .”).
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concluded that the first factor favored fair use, because the copying
fulfilled the section 107 preamble-listed purposes of teaching students and
for scholarship and was performed by a nonprofit educational institution
“for strictly nonprofit educational purposes.” The court distinguished the
photocopy cases, whose defendants were for-profit entities. Pointing to the
statute’s explicit inclusion of classroom copies, the court rejected the
plaintiffs’ argument that the non-creative nature of the copying weighed
against fair use. Applying the second factor, the court deemed the works
primarily informational, hence more subject to fair use. The final two
factors furnished the most significant, and debatable, aspects of the court’s
analysis.
With respect to the third factor, the “amount and substantiality of
the portion used, in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole,” the court
attributed little significance to the Classroom Guidelines. Since the
Guidelines’ safe harbor set the minimum standards of educational fair use,
not the maximum, the court concluded that the outcome of this factor’s
analysis did not turn on meeting the Guidelines requirements. Turning
instead to the text of the third factor, the court addressed the question of
what constituted “the copyrighted work as a whole,” in relation to which
the amount and substantiality of the defendant’s copying should be
evaluated. Although the publishers urged that each chapter of their
copyrighted books should be seen as a separate work, so that copying an
entire chapter would constitute copying the entire work, the court ruled
that the argument was not timely raised. Moreover, conflating copyright
ownership with the identification of the “work,” the court indicated that
since the publishers had obtained copyright assignments from the authors
of the separate contributions to edited volumes, those contributions should
not be assessed separately for purposes of fair use analysis, lest the
publishers “choke out nonprofit educational use of the chapter as a fair
use.” The court “w[ould] not allow this to happen,”45 and therefore
analyzed the substantiality of the copying with respect to the book as a
whole.46
Of course, an amount quantitatively insubstantial with respect to
the book as a whole could be qualitatively substantial, and therefore weigh
against fair use, but the court determined that because the books were
divided into distinct topics, the copied excerpts lacked “a dominant
45

863 F. Supp. 2d at 1234.
By contrast, in Texaco, the court addressed not only the journal issue as a whole, but
treated each article as a “work” for purposes of the analyses of substantiality and market
impact.
46
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relationship to the substance of the work as a whole.”47 It is not clear what
this standard means, but it appears to make qualitative insubstantiality an
inevitable consequence of addressing more than one topic per book.
Moreover,
it is relevant that selection of a whole chapter of a book (either from
a typical, single author chapter book or from an edited book) likely
will serve a more valuable educational purpose than an excerpt
containing a few isolated paragraphs. Professors want students to
absorb ideas and useful, context-based information. This can be
accomplished better through chapter assignments than through
truncated paragraphs. However, the selected excerpt must fill a
demonstrated, legitimate purpose in the course curriculum and must
be narrowly tailored to accomplish that purpose.48
Thus, more copying is called for rather than less, especially since a court
is unlikely to second-guess the instructor’s determination – by virtue of
assigning the excerpt – that the excerpt “fills a legitimate purpose in the
course curriculum . . .”
The same consideration that the publishers
signaled as evidence of the qualitative substantiality of the excerpt instead
bolsters the defense that the institution took no more than appropriate to
the pedagogical task.
In any event, the court’s treatment of the fourth factor, the effect
on the potential market for or value of the work, arguably rendered
irrelevant its analysis of the amount and substantiality of the copying,
apart from its determination that the copyrighted “works” at issue were the
whole books in which the copied excerpts appeared. The court viewed the
danger of market substitution as the principal concern under this factor,
and set the substitution threshold at 10% of the book as a whole. The
court in effect created a bright-line presumption in favor of fair use if the
defendant copied no more than 10% of the pages of a book containing
fewer than ten chapters, or up to but not more than one chapter of a book
with ten or more chapters.
Whatever the merits of the 10% free pass, the court’s treatment of
excerpts in excess of 10% suggests a useful approach of broader potential
application, as we will see in subsequent sections of this article. The court
acknowledged the significance of the market for licensing excerpts (even
if the full book supplies the reference point for the quantum of copying),
and the deleterious impact on the value of the work were licensing fees to
47
48

863 F. Supp. 2d at 1233.
Id.
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go unpaid. But the court concluded that “[f]or loss of potential license
revenue to cut against fair use, the evidence must show that licenses for
excerpts of the works at issue are easily accessible, reasonably priced, and
that they offered excerpts in a format which is reasonably convenient for
users.”49 For many of the works at issue, the court concluded that the
record did not establish that licenses for digital copies of the works were
available in 2009 when the defendants put the excerpts at issue on
electronic reserve. Where “digital permissions were not shown to be
available,” the court ruled that the defendants’ use “caused no actual or
potential damage to the value of the books’ copyrights.”50 Where digital
permissions were available, by contrast, the court ruled that the fourth
factor would weigh heavily against fair use.51 In other words, the court
instituted a “license it, or lose it” system. Or, more accurately, the court
gave ten percent off the top to the educational institution (this is the social
welfare subsidy) and then imposed a solution akin to a compulsory
license. Except that where compulsory licenses in copyright have
traditionally been creatures of legislation, with government-set rates, here
the court in effect compelled the copyright owners to license, lest the use
be allowed for free, but left the rate-setting to the parties, subject, perhaps,
to judicial verification that the licenses “are easily accessible [and]
reasonably priced.” We will return to “license it, or lose it” when we
address copyright exceptions for redistributive uses in other countries, and
in our proposals for U.S. copyright reform.
2.

Library uses

Library uses present another instance of social subsidy fair use.
Unlike educational photocopying (whose partial “Guidelines” appear in an
appendix to the report of the House Judiciary Committee), specified types
of library copying received explicit statutory coverage in section 108 of
the 1976 Act. Section 108, however, was drafted with such specificity
that, despite some updating in 1998, it has failed to keep pace with digital
technologies.52 Section 108 nonetheless points to further flexibility by

49

Id. at 1237.
Id. at 1238.
51
The court accordingly found five instances of use it deemed not “fair.” See also
Cambridge University Press v. Becker, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123154 (N.D. Ga. August
10, 2012) (relief for five instances of copyright infringement).
52
See, e.g., Library of Congress, The Section 108 Study Group Report, March 2008, at i
(“Due to the rapid pace of technological and social change, the law embodies some nowoutmoded assumptions about technology, behavior, professional practices, and business
models.”).
50
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cautioning that “Nothing in this section . . . in any way affects the rights of
fair use as provided by section 107 . . .”53
Authors Guild v. Hathi Trust,54 tested the relationship between the
two provisions. The district court announced a broad fair use privilege to
create and store digital copies of entire books for purposes of enabling
access to the contents of books by the visually impaired, and to enable
“data mining” of full text. The district court rejected the authors’
contention that the constraints contained within section 108, notably
disallowing “systematic” reproductions, limited the scope of fair use.
Although the Hathi Trust libraries were engaged in further copying of the
full scans of their collections (digitized by Google) the court observed that
“the wholesale copying of works” could be permissible “where the use
and purpose for the copies was clearly distinguishable from those of the
original.”55 The data mining uses did not generate any output of
copyrightable expression; the print-disabled formed an audience distinct
from the readers to whom the copyright owners marketed the books:
“[P]rovision of access for them was not the intended use of the original
work (enjoyment and use by sighted persons) and this use is
transformative.”56
(The latter rationale comes perilously close to
suggesting that anytime a third party develops a new audience for the
work, distribution of the work to that audience is “transformative.”)
The first factor finding of “transformative use” influenced the
court’s analysis of the fourth factor, for a “transformative use” fills a
“transformative market,” which, at least for non-commercial uses, is
presumed not to substitute for the work’s usual markets.57 The court gave
short shrift to the authors’ contended economic harm from lost licensing
opportunities.
First, and perhaps circularly, if the market is
“transformative,” there is no cognizable harm because impairment to a
transformative, as opposed to a traditional, market doesn’t count. Second,
the costs of creating a licensing market are too great to permit developing
such a market. Third, there is no evidence that a collective licensing
53

17 U.S.C. § 108(f)(4).
902 F.Supp.2d 445 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)
55
Id. at 460.
56
Id at 461.
57
As many commentators have recognized, the first and fourth factors have long
dominated judicial application of section 107. Already the essential factor one inquiry,
“transformative use” now seems to become transformed (distorted) into a determinative
factor four assessment as well. Perhaps, to use Barton Beebe’s term, a factor one finding
of “transformative use” now results in “stampeding” all the other factors, including, and
especially, the fourth.
54
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solution (which would reduce the cost of implementing a licensing
program) is in fact in prospect.
A perceived social imperative may well underlie the court’s rather
cavalier treatment of the potential licensing market. Concluding its fair
use analysis, the court declared, “I cannot imagine a definition of fair use
that would not encompass the transformative uses made by Defendants’
M[ass] D[igitization] P[roject] and would require that I terminate this
invaluable contribution to the progress of science and cultivation of the
arts that at the same time effectuates the ideals espoused by the
A[mericans with] D[isabilities] A[ct].”58 Note the court’s assumption that
were the fair use defense to fail, the libraries’ socially beneficial initiatives
would have to be “terminated.” If the choice is all-or-nothing, a fair use
outcome is assured. But, as the Georgia State ruling suggests, the Hathi
Trust court may have embraced a false dichotomy. Admittedly, in
Georgia State, a licensing mechanism, through the Copyright Clearance
Center, already existed, but it was not adequate to the task at the time the
electronic reserves program began. The Georgia federal court’s ruling
surely will provide the impetus to improve the licensing program so that it
does respond to the demand. Hathi Trust does not even give licensing a
chance. One might rejoin that there is no need to license if the use is
fair.59 But if the use is fair because it supposedly can’t reasonably be
licensed, then nipping licensing in the bud deprives the author of
compensation and gives the user an unwarranted free pass.60 This brings
us to the second class of redistributive uses, characterized not by social
benefit, but by “market failure”.
B.

Market failure/new market fair use

“Market failure” may mean many things to many courts and
commentators. I am here using it in the sense proposed by Wendy Gordon
as “market malfunction” rather than what she calls “inherent limitation,”
which I understand to import a normative gloss: a market could function,
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Id. at 465.
See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 14, at 1824-25; Mark Lemley, Should a Licensing Market
Require Licensing?, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 185 (2007); Matthew Africa, The
Misuse of Licensing Evidence in Fair Use Analysis: New Technologies, New Markets,
and the Courts, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1145, 1148-49 (2000). This objection, however,
primarily arises in the context of new works rather than new distributions.
60
There may, however, be other justifications, such as solicitude for the visuallyimpaired, for allowing the use for free.
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but policy reasons make such markets undesirable.61 Large-scale noncreative uses, particularly in the digital environment, may make the cost of
seeking and paying for authorization prohibitive for the user, while
yielding little advantage for the copyright owner. The public interest (here
equated, perhaps abusively, with that of the user) in the new form of
distribution thus would be frustrated, with insufficient countervailing
benefit to creators (were there such a benefit, it would serve the long-term
interest of the public in ensuring that we “have a supply of good books”62).
If “market failure” primarily concerns practical inability to develop a
paying market, a variant on the theme of “market malfunction” is
unwillingness to develop the market. While the exclusive rights copyright
vests in authors normally entitle them to decide whether and how to
exploit their works, courts have on occasion rejected infringement claims
in order to allow the new market to emerge,63 or in order to counter
perceived copyright owner abuse.64 (The two variants, moreover, are not
61

See Wendy Gordon, Excuse and Justification in the Law of Fair Use: Transaction
Costs Have Always Been Only Part of the Story, 50 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 149, 151-53
(2003). Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. 569 (1993), is a good example of an “inherent
limitation”: when the Court announced there was “the law recognizes no derivative
market for critical works, including parody,” id. at 592, it was making a normative, not
an empirical, declaration.
62
Macaulay, A Speech delivered in the House of Commons on the 5th of February, 1841,
Parliamentary Debates on the Copyright Bill, Hansard, 3rd Ser., 56 (1841): 341-60 (5
Feb.),
available
at
Primary
Sources
on
Copyright
(1450-1900),
http://copy.law.cam.ac.uk/cam/tools/request/showRecord.php?id=record_uk_1841c.
Many commentators cite Macaulay’s characterization of copyright as an “exceedingly
bad” “tax on readers for the purpose of giving a bounty to writers,” without
acknowledging that in the same speech, Macaulay also said: “The advantages arising
from a system of copyright are obvious. It is desirable that we should have a supply of
good books: we cannot have such a supply unless men of letters are liberally
remunerated; and the least objectionable way of remunerating them is by means of
copyright. You cannot depend for literary instruction and amusement on the leisure of
men occupied in the pursuits of active life. Such men may occasionally produce
compositions of great merit. But you must not look to such men for works which require
deep meditation and long research. Works of that kind you can expect only from persons
who make literature the business of their lives. . . . Such men must be remunerated for
their literary labour. And there are only two ways in which they can be remunerated. One
of those ways is patronage [which Macaulay excoriated]; the other is copyright.”
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Kelly, 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003).
64
“Copyright trolling” occurs when the owners of copyrights (not the original authors of
the copyrighted works) bring infringement claims with the sole goal of profiting through
litigation, usually by forcing quick settlements. A notable example of a “troll” is
Righthaven, LLC, which has brought numerous infringement claims in recent years. See,
e.g., Righthaven, LLC v. Va. Citizens Def. League, Inc., No. 2:10-CV-01683-GMN,
2011 WL 2550627 (D. Nev. June 23, 2011) (suing nonprofit group for posting article on
website); Righthaven, LLC v. Hoehn, 792 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1151 (D. Nev. 2011), aff'd
in part, vacated in part, 716 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2013) (suing individual posting
copyrighted work in online forum); Righthaven, LCC v. Jama, No. 2:10–CV–1322 JCM
(LRL) (D. Nev. Apr. 22, 2011) (suing nonprofit group as in Va. Citizens Def. League,
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mutually exclusive, with the latter sometimes reinforcing the former.65)
The examples I will consider are private copying and mass digitization.
Mass digitization in turn covers “orphan works,” databases of copyrighted
works, of which Google’s book-scanning program is the leading instance,
and image search engines.
1.

Private copying

As end-users already, and will increasingly, enjoy copyrighted
works of all kinds through licensed access-based models,66 the market
failure problem of private copying may appear vestigial. “On demand”
transmissions may replace both retention and “time-shifting” copies, for
there is no need to “time-shift” when one can receive the work at any time,
and no need to possess a copy if the content is accessible at will. U.S.
caselaw does not in any event support a general private copying fair use
exception for retention copies67; an exception does in effect exist for
analog copies of musical recordings,68 and another is in place for backup
copies of computer programs,69 but they are the fruits of specific
legislation, not fair use litigation. The Supreme Court in Sony Corp. of
America v. Universal City Studios70 did, however, rule (on a rather
cursory, and now partly-abandoned, analysis71) that time-shifting of free
broadcast television was a fair use. I will not here rehearse the reasoning
and critiques of Sony other than to observe that the 5-justice majority may
have perceived an all-or-nothing choice: extending fair use to copying
with court noting that use of copyright by plaintiffs “has been shown to be nothing more
than litigation-driven”). See also Brad Greenberg, Copyright Trolls and Presumptively
Fair Uses, 85 U. Colo. L. Rev. 53, 111-14 (2014) (suggesting bad faith should lead to a
presumption of fair use).
65
According to a leading account of the business backstory to the Sony “Betamax case,”
the studios were endeavoring to shut down the video tape recorder in favor of the
playback-only Video disk technology that the studios had licensed. See James Lardner,
Fast Forward: Hollywood, The Japanese, and the Onslaught of the VCR 28—36 (1987).
66
See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, From Having Copies to Experiencing Works: The
Development of an Access Right in U.S. Copyright Law, 50 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 113
(2003).
67
See, e.g., UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.Com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d. 349 (S.D.N.Y.
2000) (rejecting fair use defense for company engaged in creating digital backup copies
of subscribers’ CDs).
68
See 17 U.S.C. § 1008 (no infringement action “based on the noncommercial use by a
consumer of [an analog recording device] for making . . . analog musical recordings.”)
69
Id. § 117(a).
70
464 U.S. 417 (1984).
71
See, e.g., Peter S. Menell & David Nimmer, Legal Realism in Action: Indirect
Copyright Liability's Continuing Tort Framework and Sony's De Facto Demise, 55
UCLA L. Rev. . 143 (2007); Jessica Litman, Mary Poppins Meets the Boston Strangler:
The Story of Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, in Dreyfuss & Ginsburg,
supra note 16, at 358.
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entire works for the same purpose for which they were disseminated was a
significant departure from prior law (as the Ninth Circuit had emphasized
below72), but limiting fair use to what was then called “productive” use of
limited portions of prior works, could have meant depriving the American
public of a widely-available and extremely popular device whose use, five
Justices concluded, was not harming the copyright owners’ television
broadcast market.73 (As the dissent stressed, the majority gave scant
consideration to the new markets that time-shifting would spawn74.)
Given Sony’s failure to blossom into a general fair use private
copying privilege,75 and the court’s subsequent retreat from its emphasis
on the significance of commercial use, one may wonder whether Sony
retains relevance. Indeed, some have suggested that if the Court had it to
do over again today, it might come out differently, notably because video
recorders now offer playback without commercials.76 Another reason to
query the continued persuasiveness of Sony’s factor four analysis (the only
factor on which the court bestowed any sustained analysis) is the
burgeoning conflict between time-shifting and video on demand. Fox
Broadcasting v DISH Network,77 illustrates the conflict, and demonstrates
how a well-advised entrepreneur can structure its copyright-dependent
technology in order to fit a new business model within fair use boundaries
even in the absence of the usual normative or market failure justifications.
Dish Network, a satellite TV transmission service which
retransmits television programming under license, offers its customers the
Hopper, a set-top box with both digital video recording and video-ondemand capabilities. Dish’s “PrimeTime Anytime” (“PTAT”) feature
72

Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963, 970 (9th Cir. 1981), rev’d,
464 U.S. 417 (“[T]he result of applying fair use to intrinsic use cases like Williams &
Wilkins Co. and this case is a fundamental restructuring of the copyright system not
justified by the statutory scheme or traditional notions of fair use.”).
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Accord, Paul Goldstein, Fair Use in Context, 31 Colum. J. L. & Arts 433, 439 (2008).
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Sony, 464 U.S. at 497-98 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“The Court has struggled
mightily to show that VTR use has not reduced the value of the Studios' copyrighted
works in their present markets. Even if true, that showing only begins the proper inquiry.
The development of the VTR has created a new market for the works produced by the
Studios.”).
75
Or to impel legislation generally to authorize but provide compensation for private
audio and video copying, apart from a very specific and largely obsolete law on digital
audio tape recorders, see 17 U.S.C., chapter 10.
76
See, e.g., Ned Snow, The TiVo Question: Does Skipping Commercials Violate
Copyright Law?, 56 Syracuse L. Rev. 27 (2005); Randal C. Picker, The Digital Video
Recorder: Unbundling Advertising and Content, 71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 205 (2004); Michael
A. Einhorn, Internet Television and Copyright Licensing: Balancing Cents and
Sensibility, 20 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. (2002).
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allows subscribers to set a single timer on the Hopper to record and store
on the Hopper all primetime programming on any of the four major
broadcast networks each night of the week. Finally, Dish’s AutoHop
feature enables users to skip commercials in PTAT recordings. Fox
charged Dish with direct and contributory infringement. The Ninth
Circuit rejected the claim of direct infringement, on the (dubious)78 ground
that only the user “made” the PTAT copies. Fox’s contributory liability
claim turned on a finding of primary infringement by Dish’s customers.
Applying Sony, the Ninth Circuit determined that Dish’s customers were
engaging in non commercial fair use time-shifting. The commercialskipping feature, the court ruled, did not affect the analysis of the
economic impact of the copying, because the television producer was not
the copyright owner of the commercials. Losing the commercials may
well have had a deleterious impact, but the harm did not derive from any
act that infringed any copyright of Fox’s. Similarly, while Fox licensed its
programming to other on-demand services such as Hulu, with which
Dish’s service competed, “the ease of skipping commercials, rather than
the on-demand availability of Fox programs, causes any market harm. And
as we have discussed, the commercial-skipping does not implicate any
copyright interest.”79
This astoundingly obtuse analysis recalls the Ninth Circuit’s
decision in Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int'l Serv. Ass'n,80 in which the panel
majority (over Judge Kozinski’s trenchant dissent) granted the credit card
payment provider’s motion to dismiss a contributory infringement claim
on the ground that the commission of the infringement did not require
processing the payment. As a matter of technology, it is true that the
copies could be made and distributed without the intervention of Visa.
But, as Judge Kozinski stressed, the pirate enterprise whose transactions
Visa processed wouldn’t be making and distributing infringing copies if it
couldn’t be paid for it.81 In Dish Network, the question should not have
been whether Fox had any copyright interest in the advertisements that the
Dish customers copied but did not view (indeed, imagine a version of
78

See Jane C. Ginsburg, Recent Developments in US Copyright – Part II, Caselaw:
Exclusive Rights on the Ebb, 218 Revue Internationale du Droit d’Auteur 167, 215--229
October 2008) (criticizing Second Circuit’s analysis of who “makes” the copy). Cf.
National Rugby League Investments Pty Limited v Singtel Optus Pty Ltd., [2012]
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723 F.3d at 1076.
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494 F.3d 788 ( 9th Cir. 2007).
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Auto-Hop which recognizes commercials and does not record them; then
even if Fox had owned those copyrights, they would not have been
infringed precisely because the customers did not copy them; nonetheless,
the economic effect in all cases remains the same). What allows free
broadcast television (and Fox’s free licensing to Hulu and other internet
services, provided they retain the ads) to be free are the advertisements;
take these away and the business model becomes unsustainable. The
“value of the work” accordingly diminishes as a result of the third party
copying and commercial-skipping.
Thus, while licensed on-demand transmissions may in general be
displacing private copying, entrepreneurs can in effect structure the
enabling of end-user time-shifting to afford most of the convenience of
video on demand (the selection of programming will not be infinite; it will
be limited to whatever is broadcast over the four networks in the course of
a week), without the pesky commercials (and, of course, without paying
the copyright owners). The operation is technically time-shifting; in
“feel” to the consumer, however, it’s essentially video on demand, but
better. Not only does the time-shifting substitute for a licensed use (no
“transformative purpose” here), but there is no inability to license ondemand access. If there is a justification for this outcome, it must be in
the court’s perception that business models to facilitate time-shifting that
free customers from commercials are desirable and should not be
suppressed by copyright owners who will not license commercial-free
retransmissions. (Either that, or the following wooden syllogism: end-user
non-commercial time-shifting via video tape recorder is fair use; the DVR
and AutoHop offer time-shifting updated for the digital age; therefore their
use is fair use too.)
2.

Mass Digitization

Mass digitization does, at least at first blush, appear to present
intractable transactions cost problems. The number of works at issue, and
the difficulty of locating their right holders, and even if located, obtaining
the necessary rights, may make fair use seem a desirable solution, even for
copying and communication of entire works. The proposition does,
however, produce an obvious anomaly: the fewer works one copies, the
weaker the case for market failure fair use; but vast, immodest, copying
entitles the copyist to persist, without permission and without paying.
Closer examination, moreover, suggests that volume of copying, standing
alone, does not suffice for a free pass, though difficulties in rightowner
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location may justify a flexible solution. In either event, if the use is to be
permitted, in many instances it should also be paid.
a.

Orphan Works

The problem of “orphan works” by now is well-known: Would-be
users who are unable to locate the copyright owner, but whose use or
exploitation would not qualify for a copyright limitation or exception
(such as fair use), must decide whether to renounce their projects or to
incur the risk that the copyright owner will reappear once the exploitation
is underway, and will demand both injunctive and substantial monetary
relief in an ensuing infringement action. Potentially frustrated users range
widely, from commercial entities who seek to reissue out-of-print works
or to create new works based on “orphan” works, to cultural institutions,
notably museums and libraries, who seek to digitize works for
preservation and educational purposes,82 to individuals who seek to
incorporate an “orphan” work in their webpage or blog. The former US
Register of Copyrights deemed the orphan works problem “pervasive.”83
When the Copyright Office first embarked on solving the problem
of orphan works, the premise of its inquiry in 2005 was that the use would
involve more copying, particularly as a result of digital media, than fair
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The European endeavors concerning orphan works have taken place primarily in the
context of the Commission’s “i2010 initiative” on digital libraries. See Communication
“i2010: digital libraries” of 30 September 2005, COM(2005) 465 final; Commission
Recommendation of 24 August 2006, on the digitisation and online accessibility of
cultural material and digital preservation (2006/585/EC), OJEU L 236/28 (31.8.2006),
Recital
10;
Recommendation
6(a)(c),
available
at

http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/activities/digital_libraries/doc/recommen
dation/recommendation_august06/en.pdf
83
See Statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, before the Subcommittee on
Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property, Committee on the Judiciary, United States
House of Representatives, 110th Congress, 2nd Session, March 13, 2008, available at
http://www.copyright.gov/docs/regstat031308.html: “In fact, the most striking aspect of
orphan works is that the frustrations are pervasive in a way that many copyright problems
are not. When a copyright owner cannot be identified or is unlocatable, potential users
abandon important, productive projects, many of which would be beneficial to our
national heritage. Scholars cannot use the important letters, images and manuscripts they
search out in archives or private homes, other than in the limited manner permitted by fair
use or the first sale doctrine. Publishers cannot recirculate works or publish obscure
materials that have been all but lost to the world. Museums are stymied in their creation
of exhibitions, books, websites and other educational programs, particularly when the
project would include the use of multiple works. Archives cannot make rare footage
available to wider audiences. Documentary filmmakers must exclude certain manuscripts,
images, sound recordings and other important source material from their films.”
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use could bear, for example republication of whole books.84 Analysis
therefore turned to remedies: might these be structured in a way that
encouraged the reuse of orphan works by lowering the (by definition,
infringing) user’s risk of substantial monetary exposure.85 More recently,
however, some commentators now argue that the difficulty of locating the
rightowner should enter, and favor, the fair use calculus, so that the user
owes no damages should the rightowner reappear.86 Orphan works
regimes (we will consider the ones in effect in the EU and in Canada in
Part II) do not spare their beneficiaries transactions costs. They may in
effect cap them, but by requiring that the would-be exploiter accomplish a
“diligent search” for rightholders, orphan works regimes in fact mandate
potentially significant expenditures in location costs. As a result, an
orphan works regime, whether based in unpaid fair use (which may raise
issues of compliance with international standards for permissible
exceptions87), or modifying remedies (essentially a form of permitted-butpaid, at least for exploitations occurring before the copyright owner’s
reappearance), or requiring payment to a fund on behalf of the missing
rightowner (with escheat to local cultural initiatives should the rightowner
not reappear after a certain time) is not an answer to the transactions cost
problem of mass digitization. Mass digitization involves wholesale
copying; orphan works regimes operate at retail. Whether for free, or
permitted-but-paid, the justification for an orphan works exception lies in
the public benefit of the reuse, particularly if the beneficiaries of the
exception are non-profit educational and library institutions, rather than as
a response to transaction costs.
b.

Databases of copyrighted works

True mass digitization, by contrast, can confront the large-scale
user with the typical transaction costs conundrum: even where a diligent
(or even not-so-diligent) search could locate the rightowner, the cost of
84

Report of the Register of Copyrights, Report on Orphan Works (2006) (“For purposes
of developing a legislative solution we have defined the ‘orphan works’ situation to be
one where the use goes beyond any exemption or limitation to copyright, such as fair
use.”).
85
H.R. 5889, S. 2913, 110th Cong, 2d sess., introduced 24 April 2008. See, Jane C.
Ginsburg, Recent Developments in US Copyright – Part I, Legislative Developments:
Orphan Works, 217 Revue Internationale du Droit d’Auteur 99 (July 2008), available at
http://lsr.nellco.org/columbia/pllt/papers/08152]
86
See, e.g., Jennifer Urban, How Fair Use Can Help Solve the Orphan Works Problem,
27 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1379 (2012) (for libraries and archives).
87
Berne 9(2), TRIPS 13; see Reply Comments of Profs. Jane C. Ginsburg and Paul
Goldstein to Copyright Office Notice of Inquiry, OWR0107.pdf at 10. (2005); Ginsburg
RIDA, supra.
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clearing rights can exceed the benefit of being able to use the work. But
these costs should not be overstated. The problem is primarily
transitional; for works currently in commerce or disseminated with some
form of copyright management information, rightowners can be found and
their terms and conditions known. (Actually having to pay or reach some
agreement with a known rightowner is not a “transactions cost” that
should dispense a commercial actor-user from either.88)
As to in-copyright, out-of-commerce works (some of which may
be “orphans”), the recently–decided Google Book scanning controversy
raises a variety of issues. With the rejection of the class action settlement
that would have allowed display of substantial portions of the books’
text,89 Google’s program and concomitant fair use defenses shrank to
providing bibliographic information and displays of “snippets” (2-3 lines)
of text in response to user search queries, as well as access to the database
of scanned books for purposes of data mining. Google still retains the
scanned full text of millions of in-copyright books, but the “output” its
users encounter either eschews copyrightable expression or consists of
very short extracts. Google had also sought to bolster its fair use argument
by invoking a variant of the transactions costs problem. In this instance
“diligent search” costs were not involved: Google made no pretense of
endeavoring to find right owners of out-of-commerce books. Rather, it
urged that the sheer number of rightholders implicated by the mass
digitization made ex ante rights clearance unduly onerous. Accordingly,
Google contended that the burden should be on the right holders to object
to Google’s use, not on Google to obtain their accord. And in what some
might consider adding insult to injury, Google contended that its program
should be deemed a fair use because rightholders had the opportunity to
“opt out”.
Arguably, the “opt out” feature was a diversion (albeit a portentous
one for the future conceptualization of copyright), and in any event seems
to have dropped out of the litigation by the time Judge Chin issued his
opinion on Nov.14, 2013. The relevant question should have been
whether to focus exclusively on the probably non-infringing outputs, or to
concentrate on the creation and maintenance of a massive full-text
commercial database. The Southern District of New York’s Hathi Trust
decision was an encouraging precedent for the former approach, though,
88

This proposition may need to be qualified with regard to non-commercial actors: the
Georgia State case suggests that failure to provide a user-friendly license could make the
copyright owner vulnerable to a successful fair use defense.
89
See Authors Guild Inc. v. Google Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 686 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
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unlike the library consortium, Google is not an eleemosynary institution,
and it is not apparent that it requires a social subsidy of the sort that
benefits non profit libraries. Nonetheless, there is a powerful argument
that exploiting a work for its non-expressive information (bibliographic or
bean-counting – how many times and in what works a given word or
phrase appears) should not even be prima-facie infringing, and the
creation of a database that enables non-expressive, but progress-ofknowledge-enhancing outputs must be equally free. But this proves too
much: under U.S. law, a library, including a commercial library, is fully
entitled to lend the books it owns; the first sale doctrine precludes any
copyright claim. But the library is not entitled to acquire the lending
copies without paying for them (or receiving them as a gift). What Google
does, or enables others to do, with the outputs may not be infringing, but
those uses should not have obscured the inputs.90
Judge Chin, however, focused almost exclusively on the outputs, in
one sentence effectively bootstrapping the inputs: “as one of the keys to
Google Books is its offering of full-text search of books, full-work
reproduction is critical to the functioning of Google Books.” That
functioning, Judge Chin celebrated as “highly transformative,” thus
following the now-rampant use of the term to bless redistributive uses of
entire works in the perceived public interest.
The use of book text to facilitate search through the display
of snippets is transformative. . . . Google Books thus uses
words for a different purpose -- it uses snippets of text to
act as pointers directing users to a broad selection of books.
Similarly, Google Books is also transformative in the sense
that it has transformed book text into data for purposes of
substantive research, including data mining and text mining
in new areas, thereby opening up new fields of research.
Words in books are being used in a way they have not been
used before.

90

Hathi Trust’s reliance on the “intermediate copying” ground for fair use is not fully
persuasive, even for non commercial entities. Three salient differences with intermediate
copying fair use cases such as Sega Enterprises, Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 915 F.2d 1510
(9th Cir. 1992): the copies there were generated as a necessary part of the copyist’s
creation of a new and independent work; the copyist did not retain the copy; and the
information needed to create the new work could not be ascertained in other ways.
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Google Books has created something new in the use of
book text -- the frequency of words and trends in their
usage provide substantive information.
Google Books does not supersede or supplant books
because it is not a tool to be used to read books. Instead, it
"adds value to the original" and allows for "the creation of
new information, new aesthetics, new insights and
understandings."
On the question of the impact of Google’s copying on the potential
market for plaintiffs’ books, Judge Chin, perhaps surprisingly, embraced
the long-spurned argument that defendant’s coping does the plaintiff a
favor by bringing the work to greater public attention.91
A reasonable factfinder could only find that Google Books
enhances the sales of books to the benefit of copyright
holders. An important factor in the success of an individual
title is whether it is discovered -- whether potential readers
learn of its existence. Google Books provides a way for
authors' works to become noticed, much like traditional instore book displays. Indeed, both librarians and their
patrons use Google Books to identify books to purchase.
Many authors have noted that online browsing in general
and Google Books in particular helps readers find their
work, thus increasing their audiences. Further, Google
provides convenient links to booksellers to make it easy for
a reader to order a book. In this day and age of on-line
shopping, there can be no doubt but that Google Books
improves books sales.92
Both Hathi Trust and Google Books adopt the premise that a
rejection of the fair use defense will deprive the public of the benefits of
the defendant’s program. But, does it follow that if the inputs are
infringing, the generation of non-infringing outputs must be “terminated”
unless the inputs are licensed? In a post-eBay93 remedial landscape, it is
not at all clear that a court would award injunctive relief, particularly if it
estimated the measure of damages as the price of one copy of each book
91

On courts’ previous failure to find this contention persuasive, see, e.g., Pierre N. Leval,
Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1105 (1990).
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Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 282, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
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547 U.S. 388 (2006).
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(for works unregistered before the infringement) or at the low end of
statutory damages ($750 per book for works registered preinfringement94). We will consider in Part III whether, as a consequence of
possible new-found judicial reluctance to order injunctive relief, the
proposed “permitted but paid” regime for certain redistributive uses may
already be evolving, particularly in failed fair use cases.
c.

Search Engines

A trio of decisions from California involving mass copying of
digitized images for inclusion in an image search engine and thumbnail
displays in response to search queries,95 presents transactions cost
problems, not necessarily with respect to finding the right owner, whose
locatable website the search engine will have “crawled”, but, again,
regarding the sheer volume of works. The announced grounds of decision,
however, have concentrated on the public benefit and lack of economic
impact of a “transformative use.” 96 Because the purpose of the copying
was “transformative” in that the purpose of the original photo was
“aesthetic”, while the search engine use was “informational,” the search
engine use did not substitute for the author’s use (though following the
search engine’s links could take one to clearly substitutional pirate sites).
The rightowner had contended that the thumbnail images displayed by the
search engine competed with the emerging market for downloading
thumbnails to cellphones, but in Perfect 10 v Amazon the 9th Circuit ruled
that the plaintiff had failed to prove that such a market truly was in
prospect. Reminded that fair use is an affirmative defense, and that the
search engine bore the burden of showing that its thumbnails did not
compromise that market, the court amended its opinion, but not the
result,97 which suggests that the burden of proof did not matter because the
court had already determined the outcome: The public benefit search
engines offer required that the use be “fair” (and therefore unpaid) one
way or another.
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17 U.S.C. secs. 412, 504(c)(1).
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc. 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007); Kelly v. Arriba
Soft Corp, 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Yandex, 2013 WL 1899851
(N.D.Cal. 2013)
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The Perfect 10 court did, however, also characterize the index as a “work.” Perfect 10
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II
Comparative Law: EU, Canada, Australia and NZ [query whether
to consider Berne-TRIPs compatibility]
The U.S. is an outlier in the broader international landscape of copyright
exceptions. The copyright laws of EU member states, Canada, Australia
and New Zealand do not include an all-purpose fair use defense (though
one has been proposed in Australia), but all these States have enacted a
panoply of copyright exceptions, many of which require remuneration.
Thus, while our fair use doctrine confronts courts with an all-or-nothing
choice, other countries have charted middle courses between barring the
use and permitting its unremunerated pursuit. Some of these measures
correspond to specific compulsory licensees in U.S. law, for example, for
cable retransmission.98 Others, however, cover some of my proposed zone
of “permitted but paid” uses. The various schemes range from
compulsory licenses with government rate-setting to “license it or lose it”
schemes in which an unremunerated exception will apply if the copyright
owner fails to offer a license. In the latter instance, the license will
generally cover a substantial number of works, and the licensor will
generally represent a collective of authors and/or publishers.
But, even with arm-twisting, licensing will work only to the extent that the
licensor has the rights to license. In the case of mass uses of works (as the
Google Books controversy has shown in the U.S.) there may be no
reasonably compassable number of rightholder representatives,
particularly where copyright owners have not authorized a representative.
The European Nordic countries have addressed this transactions cost
problem by imposing an “extended collective license” regime, in which
the works of unrepresented rightholders will be brought within the
collective management society’s licensing authority once the society has
attained a (legislatively specified) critical mass of rightholders. More
recently, the French legislature in 2012 devised a Google-esque solution to
mass book-scanning, by combining an opt-out regime with collective
licensing of the digital rights of the remaining books designated by the
national library for scanning and republication. Collective management of
the grant or administration of the licenses ensures that the authors (and not
merely the publishers or other distribution intermediaries) will receive a
share of the licensing revenue.
98

See, e.g., Copyright Act 1968 (as amended) §135 (Austl.); Copyright Act 2012 §31
(Can.); Consolidated Act on Copyright 2010 §35 (Den.); Copyright and Related Rights
Act 2000 (as amended) §175 (Ir.); Copyright Act 1994 (as amended) §88 (N.Z.);
Copyright, Designs, Patents Act 1988 (as amended) §73(4) (U.K.).
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Finally, with respect to “orphan works” whose rightholders cannot be
found despite a diligent search, the E.U. and Canada authorize certain uses
by certain classes of users; permission may be obtained through a
designated licensing authority. These regimes have also addressed the
compensation due to those rightholders who subsequently reappear. This
section of the article will summarize current regimes and pending law
reform measures abroad that might inspire a U.S. “permitted but paid”
regime.
The regimes may be divided as follows: A. License it or lose it; B. Use
permitted; remuneration required; C. French Law on “Unavailable
Books”; D. Orphan works.
A. License it or lose it
“License it or lose it” offers one response to the transactions cost problem
of large-scale use of copyrighted works. The use in question will fall
under a statutorily-specified unremunerated exception unless there is a
collective license in place for the use and, usually, if the user was
reasonably aware of the licensing scheme. In effect, it places the burden
on the copyright owners to organize collective licensing of certain uses by
making them uncompensated otherwise. The United Kingdom and New
Zealand currently follow this approach. In the existing schemes and in the
proposed scheme, these exceptions/uses are explicitly enumerated in the
statute and noted to be unremunerated only in the absence of a licensing
scheme. Some of the exceptions, particularly for cable retransmissions
and for certain uses for the benefit of the visually impaired, address uses
which are currently the subject of compulsory licensing or an outright
exemption in the US.
In the United Kingdom, the scheme includes the following uses: 99
1)
recording certain broadcasts or copies of broadcasts for placement
in non-profit archives; educational establishments recording broadcast or
copies of broadcasts for non-commercial educational purposes;
2)
specially designated bodies making copies of broadcasts for deaf,
hard of hearing and handicapped with subtitled modifications as needed;
and

99

Copyright, Designs, Patents Act 1988 (as amended) §§35, 74, 31 (U.K.).
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3)
making copies and published editions for personal use of visually
impaired, including Braille editions and spoken word recordings.
New Zealand: 100
1)
copying sound recording for instruction or relating to learning a
language by correspondence and copying done by person giving or
receiving lesson and no charge is made for supplying copy;
2)
copying and communication of a “communication work”101 made
or communicated by or on behalf of or made and supplied by an
educational resource supplier for an educational purpose;
3)
official archives playing or showing films or sound recordings so
long as payment to view/hear no more than a reasonable contribution
toward maintenance of archive;
4)
media monitors recording or transcribing communication work that
consists wholly or substantially of news reports or discussions of current
events if conditions met (parties negotiate or government sets rate but this
does not apply if there is a licensing scheme in place); and
5)

cable retransmission of communication works.

The proposed changes to Australia’s copyright legislation102 include
replacement of certain statutory licenses with either negotiated licenses or
a newly-introduced, U.S.-inspired unpaid fair use exception. Existing
statutory licensing schemes currently in place for governments,
educational institutions and institutions assisting persons with a print
disability would all be repealed. Under the proposed new scheme, these
licenses should be negotiated voluntarily. However, institutions would not
need to negotiate licenses for uses that the parties or the courts considered
to be fair use.
B. Use permitted; remuneration required
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Copyright Act 1994 (as amended) §§44, 48, 57, 91, 88 (N.Z.).
A “communication work” includes “radio and TV broadcasts and Internet
transmissions, separate from the films, music and other material which they contain,”
Copyright Council of New Zealand, An introduction to copyright in New Zealand
(January
2009)
at
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Here, an author may not prohibit specific enumerated uses, but she is
entitled to equitable remuneration for these uses. In most instances, a
collecting society is responsible for collecting and distributing
remuneration and often is the only party who may assert a claim. The key
issue, of course, is how the remuneration is set. National legislation
discloses three variants on the theme: 1) private parties (usually collecting
societies) voluntarily set the remuneration rate; 2) private parties set the
remuneration rate but the government steps in to determine the rate when
the private parties can’t agree; and 3) government requires users to obtain
licenses from collecting societies. The following is not exhaustive: it
covers only some EU member states and lists only those exceptions that
do not correspond to a compulsory license already present in U.S. law.103
Cumulatively, the categories suggest the kinds of uses that might populate
a U.S. Permitted but Paid regime.
1.

Private Parties Set Remuneration Rate

In Austria, the author is entitled to equitable remuneration that may only
be asserted by a collecting society for the following uses:104
1) reproducing and distributing published individual works of language to

extent justified by purpose (e.g. churches, schools) and also broadcasts
designated to be school broadcasts;
2) reproducing and distributing individual published works which by

nature and designation intended for use in schools or teaching;
3) libraries using video or audio media for public recitation, performance

or presentation of works for no more than two visitors at a time and not for
profit;
4) schools and higher educational establishments publicly performing

cinematographic work for purposes of teaching to extent justified (but
does not apply to works intended for teaching); and
5) accommodation enterprises publicly showing cinematographic works to

guests provided that more than two years have elapsed since work’s first
performance, performance carried out with aid of permitted audio or video
medium and spectators admitted free of charge.

103

I do not here address private copying levies.

104

Federal Law on Copyright in Works of Literature and Art and on Related Rights 1998
§§45, 51, 54(1)(3), 56(b)-(c) (Austria).
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Finland: 105
In Finland, the author has a right to remuneration for the following uses:
1) reproducing published works by means other than sound and moving

images for those who cannot use the works in the ordinary manner due to
disability or illness (but government issues decree on which institutions
are entitled to make copies to lend, sell or use); and
2) reproducing minor parts of short published literary or artistic works for

use in educational compilation after required years have elapsed since
publication (but does not apply to works created for use in education).
Germany: 106
In Germany, the author is entitled to equitable remuneration, which in
most instances may only be asserted by a collecting society, for the
following uses:
1) reproducing

work for non-commercial purposes for exclusive
distribution to persons with disabilities if reproduction is necessary for
such access;

2) reproducing, distributing and making available published works in non-

commercial basic and further training facilities, vocational training
facilities, or for church use (but must communicate intent to author or
rights holder);
3) reproducing, distributing and communicating newspaper articles and

broadcast commentaries and connected illustrations in newspapers and
similar information sheets (but not required if short extracts of several
articles or commentaries used for overview);
4) publicly performing published work to public if serves non-profit-

making purpose of event organizer, participants admitted free of charge
and performers unpaid (but not required to pay for events organized by
youth, social welfare, geriatric or prisoner’s welfare); and
5) public libraries reproducing and transmitting small parts of published

articles by post or fax (but limitations on electronic reproduction).
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Copyright Act 1961 (as amended) §§17-18 (Fin.).
Law on Copyright and Neighboring Rights 1998 (as amended) §§45(a), 46, 49(1), 52,
53(a) (Ger.).
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Lithuania: 107
In Lithuania, the author is entitled to remuneration through compulsory
licenses that are administered and distributed by the appropriate collecting
society for the following uses:
1) reproducing by reprography for non-commercial purposes published

articles or other short work, short extract of writing with or without
illustrations; and
2) reproducing by reprography for non-commercial purposes work kept in
publicly accessible libraries, educational establishments, museums or
archives, except when over the internet, for purpose of replacement of a
lost, destroyed, unfit-for-use copy in own or other archive or library if
impossible to obtain by other means.

Netherlands: 108
In the Netherlands, the author must be paid equitable remuneration for the
following uses:
1) libraries and educational institutions making copies of printed works for

their library services and for students;
2) use for the benefit of people with a disability if the use is non-

commercial and related to the disability.
Norway: 109
In Norway, the author is entitled to remuneration for the following uses:
1) copying published work to use in public examination;
2) reproducing collective work for use in religious services or education or

minor parts of literary/scientific works or musical works or short works if
five years have elapsed since the expiry of the year in which the work was
published;
3) reproducing published works of art and photos in connection with the

text of a critical or scientific treatise which is not of a generally

107

Law on Copyrights and Related Rights 1999 (as amended) Art. 23 (Lith.).
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informative character when done with proper usage and to extent
necessary to achieve desired purpose; and
4) reproducing published works of art and photos in newspapers,

periodicals and broadcasts in connection with reporting a current event
(but does not apply if the current event is related to the work that is
reproduced).
Poland: 110
In Poland, the author must be paid remuneration for the following uses:
1) including excerpts from larger works or entire small works in textbooks

and in anthologies that are collections of excerpts for scientific or
educational purposes;
centers for scientific and technical information distributing single
copies of excerpts from published works; and

2)

3) reproducing published works of fine art in encyclopedias and atlases

when attempts to contact copyright owners for permission encounter
serious obstacles.
Spain: 111
In Spain, the author is entitled to equitable remuneration for the following
uses:
1) reproducing, distributing, and communicating works disseminated in

mass media studies and articles on current events (unless rights expressly
reserved).
Sweden: 112
In Sweden, the author must be paid equitable remuneration for the
following uses:
1) using by and for the disabled beyond specifically exempted thresholds;

and
2) distributing more than a few copies or communicating or distributing

copies and recordings that disabled persons can retain.
110

Act on Copyright and Related Rights1994 (as amended) Arts. 29.2, 30.2, 33.3 (Pol.).
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2. Private Parties Set Remuneration Rate, Copyright Tribunals set rate if
Parties Cannot Agree
Australia: 113
In Australia, the Copyright Tribunal sets the rate if private parties cannot
agree on a rate for the following uses:
1) reproducing articles or reasonable portion of published or unpublished

works in electronic form by educational institutions, including visual art
alongside text;
2) reproducing published literary and dramatic works for the research,

study or instruction of a person with a print disability, including in
electronic form;
3) copying to assist persons with intellectual disabilities if material is not

commercially available; print disability license holders broadcasting
published literary and dramatic works and adaptations;
4) qualifying institution copying a broadcast, or any work, sound recording

or film in a transmission for education for the disabled;
5) performing sound recordings in places open to the public.

Denmark: 114
In Denmark, the Copyright License Tribunal sets the rate in if private
parties cannot agree on a rate for the following uses:
1) use of published sound recordings in broadcasts on radio and television

and other public performances (but excluding on-demand Internet
transmission);
2) non-commercial use and distribution of copies of published works

specifically intended for the blind, visually impaired, deaf and sufferers of
speech impediments, including sound recordings of literary works for
visually impaired (but no other sound recordings of literary or musical
works); and

113
114

Copyright Act 1968 (as amended) §§135, 108 (Austl.)
Consolidated Act on Copyright 2010 §§68, 17(1)-(3), 18 (Den.).
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3)use of minor portions of literary and musical works or such works of

small proportions and works of art in connection with the text in
composite works compiling contributions by a large number of authors for
use in educational activities provided that five years have elapsed since the
work was published.
Italy: 115
In Italy, the rate is set based on criteria set out by the Presidency of the
Council of Ministers if private parties cannot agree on a rate for the
following uses:
1)

reproducing protected works in anthologies for educational use;

and
New Zealand: 116
In New Zealand, the Copyright Tribunal sets the rate in if private parties
cannot agree on a rate for the following uses:
librarian making copies of published editions for collections of other
libraries
Sweden: 117
In Sweden, the court sets the rate if private parties cannot agree on a rate
for the following uses:
1)

reproducing protected materials in compilations made and used for
educational purposes.

When the parties cannot agree, the state may resolve the rate
through national Copyright Boards or Tribunals. Generally speaking,
Copyright Tribunals seem to play the largest role in Australia, New
Zealand, the United Kingdom and Canada. In most instances, however,
this role remains fairly minor. In Australia, for example, parties generally
agree on a rate amongst themselves and the Copyright Tribunal hears
approximately two matters per year.118 Similarly in New Zealand,
collecting societies set rates and the Tribunal steps in when the collecting
115

Law No. 633 of April 22, 1941 for the Protection of Copyright and Neighboring
Rights (as amended) Arts. 46(3), 58, 51-59, 70(2), 60 (It.).
116
Copyright Act 1994 (as amended) §§54, 63 (N.Z.).
117
Act on Copyright in Literary and Artistic Works 1960 (as amended) Art. 18 (Swed.).
118
Email correspondence with Paddy Hannigan, Deputy District Registrar, Australian
Copyright Tribunal Feb. 9, 2014.
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society rate is challenged. These challenges often result in interparty
settlements and the Tribunal issues a rate only if the matter goes to a full
hearing, which rarely occurs.119 In the United Kingdom, the Copyright
Tribunal primarily confirms rates that private parties have agreed upon
themselves.120
The Copyright Board plays the largest role in rate-setting in
Canada, as certain collecting societies are required by law to set tariffs for
certain uses. Here, the collecting society publishes the tariff and parties
are given a chance to object. If a party does not object, the tariff is
confirmed. If a party does object, the Copyright Board proceeds to a
hearing, but frequently during this process parties negotiate and agree on a
rate amongst themselves and ask the Copyright Board to certify that rate
six to twelve months later, before the matter goes to a full hearing. The
Copyright Board sets the rate only when the parties cannot come to an
agreement amongst themselves. For uses that are not required by law to
have a tariff, parties generally negotiate amongst themselves and may file
the rate with the Copyright Board but are not required to do so. On rare
occasion, the Copyright Board may be asked to act as an arbiter or set a
tariff with regard to these uses.121
3. Government Requires License from Collecting Society - Extended
Collective Licensing122
The Nordic countries have since the early 1960s facilitated the
large-scale licensing of works, generally for public purposes, by
legislation that brings works unrepresented by the relevant collecting
society within the licensing authority of that society. Some, but not all, of
the statutory provisions allow rightholders to opt out of the collective
license. Extended collective licenses (ECL) have received considerable
attention lately, as a possible solution to the orphan works and mass
digitization problems.123 Scholars from the Nordic countries, however,

119

Email correspondence with Prof. Susy Frankel, President, N.Z. Copyright Tribunal,Mar. 3,
2014.
120
Email correspondence with Catherine Worley, U.K. Copyright Tribunal, Feb. 20, 2014.
121
Phone conversation with Dr. Raphael Solomon, Director, Research & Analysis, Copyright
Board Canada, Mar. 3, 2014.
122
See generally Jens Schovbo and Thomas Riis, Extended Collective Licenses and the
Nordic Experience, 33 Colum J. L. & Arts 471 (2010); Gunnar Karnell, Extended
Collective License Clauses and Agreements in Nordic Copyright Law, 10 Colum J. L. &
Arts 73 (1985).
123
See generally, David R. Hansen, et al, Solving the Orphan Works Problem in the
United States, 37 Colum. J.L. & Arts 1 (2013); Katharina de la Durantaye, Finding a
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have expressed skepticism that the approach can be generalized to nations
lacking the Nordic countries’ particular traditions of social organization.124
Nonetheless, I summarize the laws’ coverage in order to give an idea of
the kinds of uses these legislatures have determined should be permitted
but paid.
ECL uses fall into a number of similar categories. They are as
follows:
1) educational uses;125
2) library and archive use;126
3) internal use in public and/or private organization;127
Home for Orphans: Google Book Search and Orphan Works Laws in the United States
and Europe, 21 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 229 (2011).
124
See Schovbo and Riis, supra note 118.
125
Consolidated Act on Copyright 2010 §13 (Den.) (copying published works and
recording works broadcast on radio and TV as well as own performance for educational
uses (does not apply to computer programs or more than brief extracts from
cinematographic works); Copyright Act 1961 (as amended) §14 (Fin.) (reproducing,
making public and performing works for educational activities and scientific research);
Copyright Act 1961 (as amended) §13(b) (Nor.) (copying published works and
broadcasts for educational activities (but does not apply to broadcasts that consist of more
than minor parts of cinematographic work); Act on Copyright in Literary and Artistic
Works 1960 (as amended) Art. 42c (Swed.) (copying works that have been made public
for educational purposes).
126
Consolidated Act on Copyright 2010 §16(b) (Den.) (public libraries digitally
reproducing articles from newspapers, magazines, composite works, brief excerpts from
published literary works and illustrations and music reproduced in connection with the
text (but does not permit broadcast by radio or TV or the making available to the public
of works in such a way that the public may access them at the place and time of their
choosing); Copyright Act 1961 (as amended) §16(d) (Fin.) (archives, public libraries,
museums reproducing and communicating works for purposes not included in
unremunerated exceptions); Copyright Act 1961 (as amended) §16(a) (Nor.) (libraries,
archives, museums copying and making available published works in their collections);
Act on Copyright in Literary and Artistic Works 1960 (as amended) Art. 42d (Swed.)
(libraries and archives communicating single articles and short portions of works to
library borrowers (but does not apply to computer programs) and distributing copies of
works prepared pursuant to library exception for purposes not included in unremunerated
exceptions).
127
Consolidated Act on Copyright 2010 §14 (Den.) (public or private institutions,
organizations and businesses copying articles, brief excerpts of descriptive published
works or musical works and illustrations for internal use to advance their own activities);
Copyright Act 1961 (as amended) §13(a) (Fin.) (reproducing published article and
accompanying illustration for internal communication); Copyright Act 1961 (as
amended) §14 (Nor.) (public and private institutions and organizations and commercial
enterprises copying published works and broadcasts for use within their own activities
(but does not apply to broadcasts that consist of more than minor parts of
cinematographic work)); Act on Copyright in Literary and Artistic Works 1960 (as
amended) Art. 42b (Swed.) (decision-making municipal assemblies, governmental and
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4) broadcasting published works;128
5) television retransmission;129
6) fixations of broadcast works for the disabled;130
7) reproducing published works of art;131

8) public access to specified public television programs at a time and place
chosen by the viewer.132
municipal authorities, enterprises and organizations copying published literary works and
works of fine art published in connection with the text by means of reprographic
reproduction in order to satisfy the need for information within their field of activities).
128
Consolidated Act on Copyright 2010 §30 (Den.) (public access television companies
broadcasting published works on radio or TV broadcast (but does not apply to satellite
unless there is a simultaneous terrestrial broadcast); Copyright Act 1961 (as amended)
§25(f) (Fin.) (broadcasting organization transmitting a work, copying work for up to a
year to use in its own broadcast for a maximum of four times per year (and potentially
longer/more depending on terms of ECL)(broadcasting organization transmitting a new
work made public if included in a TV program produced by the broadcasting
organization and transmitted before January 1, 1985); Copyright Act 1961 (as amended)
§30 (Nor.) (broadcast organizations named by King broadcasting published work); Act
on Copyright in Literary and Artistic Works 1960 (as amended) Art. 42e (Swed.) (sound
radio and television organizations specified by government broadcasting public literary,
musical and fine art works (but does not apply to works made for the stage and only
applies to transmissions via satellite if the broadcasting organization simultaneously
carries out a broadcast through a terrestrial transmitter)).
129
Consolidated Act on Copyright 2010 §35 (Den.) (simultaneous retransmission on
cable of works broadcast wirelessly on radio or television); Copyright Act 1961 (as
amended) §25(4) (Fin.) (retransmitting work included in radio or TV transmission for
reception by the public simultaneously with the original transmission); Copyright Act
1961 (as amended) §34 (Nor.) (broadcast organizations using works that are lawfully
included in a broadcast and communicating to public by simultaneous and unaltered
retransmission); Act on Copyright in Literary and Artistic Works 1960 (as amended) Art.
42f (Swed.) (transmitting or retransmitting to public, simultaneously and in unaltered
form, by wire or wireless means, works which form part of a wireless sound radio or TV
broadcast).
130
Consolidated Act on Copyright 2010 §17(4) (Den.) (government, municipal and other
social nonprofit institutions reproducing sound or visual recordings broadcast on TV or
radio in a manner accessible to visually handicapped and hearing-impaired people by
means of sound or visual recordings); Copyright Act 1961 (as amended) §17(b) (Nor.)
(producing and using fixations for the disabled (and King may issue regulations regarding
right to make a fixation of published film or picture with or without sound not essentially
consisting of musical works)).
131
Consolidated Act on Copyright 2010 §24(a) (Den.) (reproducing published works of
art); Copyright Act 1961 (as amended) §25(a)(2) (Fin.) (reproducing work of art in
collection or sale for purposes other than promoting the exhibit/sale).
132
Consolidated Act on Copyright 2010 §30(a) (Den.) (public access to state-owned
television company productions at places and times selected by the viewer); Copyright
Act 1961 (as amended) §32 (Nor.) (specific broadcasting organizations using issued
works in their collections and in connection with new broadcasts and transmissions in
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C. French Law on “Unavailable Books”
The French legislature in March 2012 unanimously enacted a law
on “unavailable books,”133 designed to make the corpus of out of print
French books digitally available (and to offer a national alternative to
Google Books, whose scanning program the Paris trial court had, not
coincidentally, condemned as copyright infringement134). The law directs
the Bibliothèque nationale to establish a database of all works published in
France before 2001 that are not available in print or digital forms. The
creation of the list derives from comparing the national library’s holdings
with databases of commercially available books, but also includes a
crowd-sourcing component. Every year, the national library will generate
a new list.
The law vests the management of the rights in a collecting society
whose board is composed of equal numbers of authors and publishers.
Once the book is listed, authors and publishers have six months to oppose
the collecting society’s management of the book. (After six months, the
author may nonetheless oppose on the basis of harm to her honor or
reputation.) If the publisher opposes, it has two years to exploit the book;
the author incurs no corresponding obligation. Thereafter, the collecting
society is empowered to exercise the right to authorize the reproduction
and communication of the book in digital form, by offering five-year
renewable non-exclusive licenses to digitize and disseminate, subject to
remuneration. The law does not in fact detail how the remuneration will
be calculated, other than to require that it be « equitably » distributed
between authors and publishers, and that the author’s share may not be
less than the publisher’s.135

such a way that individuals can choose time and place of access to the work (only applies
to works broadcast before January 1, 1997 that are part of broadcaster’s own productions
and author may prohibit use).
133
Loi no 2012-287 du 1er mars 2012 relative à l’exploitation numérique des livres
indisponibles du XXe siècle (1) [Law 2012-287 of Mar. 1, 2012 on the Digital
Exploitation of Unavailable Books of the Twentieth Century], Journal Official de la
République Française [J.O] [Official Gazette of France], Mar. 2 2012, p. 3986, effective
as of the publication of décret n°2013-182 of Feb.27, 2013 on the application of articles
L.134-1 à L.134-9 of the Code of intellectual property. The French Constitutional
Council recently rejected a challenge to the constitutionality of this law, see Cons.
constitutionnel No. 213-370 QPC, 28 Feb. 2014.
134
Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris, 3d chamber, Judgment of Dec. 19, 2009
(Editions du Seuil v Google,), available at http://www.legalis.net/?page=jurisprudencedecision&id_article=2812
135
Code de la Propriété Intellectual, art.L.134-3 II cl. 5 et seq. (Fr.)
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Absent opposition, the collecting society must first offer the
original print publisher a ten-year automatically renewable exclusive
license to reproduce and make the work available in digital form. The
publisher has two months to respond, and, if it exercises this right of first
refusal, three years to make the book available. If the publisher does not
exercise the right, or fails to publish digitally within 3 years, the collecting
society will offer non-exclusive digitization and dissemination licenses to
all comers. The author may oppose the grant of the exclusive license to
the original print publisher if the author proves that the publisher did not
acquire digital rights. The author may at any time withdraw the collecting
society’s power to grant non-exclusive digitization licenses if the author
proves that he or she alone held digitization rights. And authors and
publishers may at any time jointly withdraw the collecting society’s
power, but the publisher must exploit the book within 18 months. Any
licenses the collecting society may already have granted will continue in
force for any remainder of the five-year period covered by the grant.
In the case of so-called “orphan books,” the French law empowers
the collecting society to authorize publicly accessible libraries to digitize
and disseminate books in their collections, if after ten years from the
inclusion of the book in the collecting society’s repertoire, the copyright
holders have not been found notwithstanding a diligent search. Libraries
pay no remuneration to the collecting society, but in turn must not derive
any economic or commercial benefit from digitizing and making the books
available.
A few observations: First, the law does not create a national digital
free lending library. With the exception of orphan books, the law does not
enable libraries freely to digitize and disseminate out of print books.
Libraries could acquire non-exclusive licenses to do so, but the licenses
must be paid for. On the other hand, the cost of those licenses may well
be considerably less than the cost of negotiating rights from the copyright
owners. It remains to be seen whether libraries would undertake the
outlay, and, if they did, whether the free availability of digitized out-ofprint books from libraries would discourage for-profit publishers from
entering the market.
Second, non exclusive licenses for exercise by libraries or others
will be granted only if the publisher does not make the book available.
Here, the law’s allocation of the respective rights of authors and publishers
is problematic, and, for France, surprising. During the first six months
following the book’s inclusion on the Bibliothèque nationale’s database,
42

both authors and publishers may oppose the collecting society’s exercise
of digitization rights. The objecting publisher, however, will have to
exploit the book within two years. But the publisher may not have
acquired digital rights, or the contract may be ambiguous as to the
acquisition of rights over new modes of exploitation. So, without making
a deal with the author, the publisher may not be in a position to oppose the
collecting society’s administration of digital rights. On the other hand, if
the publisher does not oppose, the collecting society administers the rights,
but must first offer them, on an exclusive basis, to the publisher who holds
the print rights. In other words, the law gives to the publishers what they
may not have received by contract. In a reversal of the usual burden of
proof regarding the scope of the author’s grant of rights, the law requires
the author to demonstrate that she retained the rights, rather than obliging
the publisher to prove their acquisition. Ambiguity in the contract now
favors the publisher. So why should the publisher bother negotiating with
the author for digital rights if the publisher can get those rights by transfer
of law? Arguably, this is expropriation, and worse, the law expropriates
authors not for the public benefit of non-profit libraries, but for the benefit
of for-profit publishers. On the other hand, the authors will be paid half
the licensing revenue; without the licensing scheme, the author would
have derived no revenue from the books that otherwise would have
remained out of commerce.
The law has now been in effect long enough for the Bibliothèque
nationale to have published an initial list of 60,000 “unavailable” titles.
The collecting society designated to administer the electronic rights in
those books has received only 2500 oppositions to the listings, mostly
from authors or publishers who claim an intention to publish a digital
edition.136 Details concerning who undertakes the digitization, and at
whose cost, remain to be worked out. As does the rate-setting for the
royalty to be paid to authors. And it is still too early to ascertain how
many of the original publishers will take up the collecting society’s
invitation to prepare a digital edition.
The law, conceived as France’s answer to Google,137 goes a step
beyond Nordic-style extended collective licenses because it vests the
136

Email from Florence Marie Piriou, counsel to Sofia, the collecting society empowered
to administer the licenses for “unavailable books,” 7 Oct.2013.
137
See, e.g., Franck Macrez, L’exploitation numérique des livres indisponibles : que
reste-t-il du droit d’auteur ?, (3 April 2012), http://franck.macrez.net/?p=210 (« the
solution that was adopted seeks to give new life to a currently neglected corpus, and to
respond to the desire for massive digitization inspired by Google»); Société nationale de
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management authority in a collecting society without requiring the society
to demonstrate that it already represents most or even some of the
rightholders.
Although the society exercises a “mandate” or
“authorization to manage,”138 it is not the rightholders who delegate this
authority (as with conventional collecting societies), but the State which
confers it. This in turn implies that the law endows the State with the
power to grant digitization licenses in pre-2001 French-published books
whose rightowners do not timely object or, having objected, do not timely
publish. The law thus also steps well beyond “opt out” in that it not only
requires authors and publishers to declare their ownership and their
objections in order to retain their rights, but also, at least for the
publishers, in fact to exercise those rights, lest they be granted to other
publishers, albeit with unspecified remuneration to the original
rightholders. The remuneration feature makes this an attenuated version
of “use it or lose it.” It is, for France, a country long wed to a highly
“propertarian” concept of copyright,139 a rather radical reworking. It is
also unlikely the legislature, in its haste to institute a national program of
book-scanning, thought through the broader implications of vesting the
State with the authority to direct digital exploitations of out of print books
(or effectively to transfer the author’s digital rights to the publishers).140
However conceptually problematic, the French law does offer
another model of permitted-but-paid. One that short circuits the
l’édition,
Numérisation des livres indisponibles, http://www.sne.fr/dossiers-etenjeux/numerique/numerisation-des-livres-indisponibles.html (genesis of the law was to
respond to Google Books’ digitzation strategy) ; . See also Lionel Maurel, De la loi sur
les indisponibles au registre ReLIRE : la blessure, l’insulte et la réaction en marche (24
March 2013), http://scinfolex.com/2013/03/24/de-la-loi-sur-les-indisponibles-a-la-baserelire-la-blessure-linsulte-et-la-reaction-en-marche/ (« Far from having done better than
Google, France has employed exactly the same dubious procedures as the search engine,
with the same consequences »)
138
Florence Marie Piriou, Nouveau régime légal des livres indisponibles du XXe siècle
(unpublished paper on file with author) (« Il ne s’agit ni d’une exception ni d’une cession
légale de droits mais plutôt d’un mandat légal » ; « At issue is neither an exception nor a
statutory transfer of rights, but rather a legal mandate (authorization). »).
139
For example, the first article of the copyright section of the Code de la Propriété
Intellectual, L. 1-111, declares (“L'auteur d'une oeuvre de l'esprit jouit sur cette oeuvre,
du seul fait de sa création, d'un droit de propriété incorporelle exclusif et opposable à
tous.” ; “The author of a work of authorship enjoys in that work, by the sole fact of its
creation, an incorporeal and exclusive property right which may be asserted against all”).
140
The French law may also clash with international norms limiting copyright exceptions
and limitations. Because these apply only to foreign works, however, the legislature has
sought to avoid the problem by limiting the law’s application to works first published in
France. To the extent that those works may include translations of foreign authors’
works, the legislation may still be vulnerable to challenge for violation of TRIPs art 13
(should any foreign government seek to bring such a challenge).
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difficulties of assembling rightholders into a collecting society, or of
extending that society’s authority to represent non members. And which
may produce some revenue for the authors of books now lying fallow. It
is also clear that any initiative of this scope would require legislative
intervention; private ordering on this scale is not an option.141
D. Orphan works
In 2012, the EU issued a Directive regarding orphan works to
permit public libraries and non-profit national broadcasters to disseminate
works of authors and rightholders who cannot be located following a
diligent search.142 The Directive requires payment of “fair compensation”
to rightowners who reappear and “put an end” to the work’s “orphan”
status.143 Because member states have until October 29, 2014 to
implement the Directive,144 however, only the UK and Hungary currently
present examples of compensation schemes. On the other hand, Canada
has long established a licensing program for works whose rightholders
cannot be found.145
1. E.U.
The Directive gives member states considerable leeway in
addressing the rights of reappearing rightholders. Art 6(5) provides that
“Member States shall be free to determine the circumstances under which
the payment of such compensation may be organised.”146 Currently, with
an October 29, 2014 deadline to transpose the Directive into national law,
only the U.K. and Hungary have adopted remuneration schemes,
a. U.K.
The Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013, 2013 c. 24,
section 77, “licensing of copyright and performers' rights,” adds a new
orphan works provision, sections 116A-116D.
The legislation
141

Cf. Authors Guild v Google, supra (scale of proposed settlement inappropriate to
private ordering).
142
Directive 2012/28/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 Oct.2012
on certain permitted uses of orphan works, OJEU L 299/5 (27 Oct.2012).
143
Id. art. 6(5) and recital 18.
144
Id., art. 9(1).
145
The Canadian Copyright Board’s issued its first decision in this regard in 1990.
MacLean Hunter Ltd. File 1990-3 (Aug. 24, 1990), available at http://www.cbcda.gc.ca/unlocatable-introuvables/licences-e.html
146
The same article states that the level of compensation will be determined by the law of
the member state whose public institution made the use; by contrast, a work’s “orphan”
status is determined according to the law of the work’s country of origin, see art. 3(3).
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contemplates a licensing regime that may be administered, pursuant to
regulations, by a state authority and/or through extended collective
licensing. The scheme appears to anticipate that the license fees will be
paid in before any missing rightholder reappears to claim compensation,
because the law directs the establishments of regulations to resolve the
treatment of unclaimed sums paid under the license.147
a. Hungary
Hungary anticipated the Orphan Works Directive by regulations
adopted in 2009.148 Like the U.K., Hungary has also based its orphan
works regime on up-front licensing, but the sole entity empowered to grant
licenses appears to be the Hungarian Patent Office. The HPO also rules
on the withdrawal of licenses in the event the author becomes known; the
HPO will also determine the extent of the remuneration due to the
author.149
2. Canada
Canada's orphan works provisions set out a regime for all potential
uses of orphan works. Section 77 of the Copyright Act permits the
Copyright Board of Canada to issue a non-exclusive license (subject to
any terms the Board establishes) for use in Canada to a user whose
reasonable efforts to locate a copyright owner have been
unsuccessful. Section 77 applies to a published work, to a fixation of a
performer's performance, published sound recording or a fixation of a
communication signal in which copyright subsists. The CBC may grant a
non-exclusive license to engage in a broad range of acts.150
The CBC will grant a license only if the user can show that s/he
made every reasonable effort to find the copyright owner. There is no
definition of "reasonable effort" in §77 and no formal standards have been
established by CBC regulation to date (though the legislation permits the
CBC to create the standard). Each licensing decision is usually issues
within 30-45 days. In setting the license fee, the CBC generally bases the
147

See id. sec. 116C (4):
The regulations must provide for the treatment of any royalties or other sums paid in
respect of a licence, including—
...
(c) the treatment of sums after that period (as bona vacantia or otherwise).
148
100/2009 (V. 8) Korm. rendelet az a´rva mu¨ egyes felhaszna´la´sainak
engede´lyeze´se´re vonatkozo´ re´szletes szaba´lyokro´l (Government Regulation on the
Detailed Rules Related to the Licensing of Certain Use of Orphan Works), arts. 2(1),
2(2), 3 (Hung.), available at http://www.hipo.gov.hu/English/jogforras/100_2009.pdf.
149
Id. arts. 7, 8.
150
See Copyright Act 2012 §77 (Can.).
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rate on what the collecting society that would normally represent the
rightholder charges for the type of use in question, and then orders that
royalties be paid directly to that collecting society (the system assumes
that every class of rightholder will have a corresponding collecting
society).151 Under §77, the subsequently appearing copyright owner may
collect the royalties fixed in the license no later than five years after its
expiration The CBC allows collective societies to dispose the royalties as
it sees fit for the general benefit of its members but the society undertakes
to reimburse any person who establishes, within 5 years after the expiry of
the license, ownership of the work covered by the license.152
III
Proposal for US copyright reform: Legislation in aid of Private
Ordering
A.

To what extent do we already have “Permitted but paid”?

If, rather than excusing altogether some socially beneficial or
market failure non authorship uses of copyrighted works, requiring
payment for them would be desirable, how might we achieve that end? In
the first place, we should inquire to what extent we already have Permitted
but Paid regimes. Some of these exist in the form of statutory compulsory
licenses. Others may be emerging as a result of judicial reluctance in the
wake of eBay v. MercExchange, to grant injunctive relief. Fuller
examination suggests, however, that the Supreme Court’s decision has not
lead to a generalized substitution of damage awards (judge-made
compulsory licenses) in lieu of injunctions.
1. Extant compulsory license regimes
The 1976 copyright act institutes compulsory licenses for
mechanical rights (creation of sound recordings of non dramatic musical
compositions for distribution of phonorecords to the public) (sec. 115);
cable and satellite retransmissions (secs. 111, 119); non-interactive digital
performances of sound recordings (sec 114.); public broadcasting (sec.
118); and jukeboxes (sec. 116). The statute also favors negotiated
solutions in lieu of administrative rate-setting,153 and accordingly provides
151

Phone conversation with Dr. Raphael Solomon, Director, Research & Analysis,
Copyright Board Canada, Mar. 3, 2014A list of CBC licenses can be found at:
http://www.cb-cda.gc.ca/unlocatable-introuvables/licences-e.html.
CBC refusals to
grant an unlocatable right owner can be found at: http://www.cb-cda.gc.ca/unlocatableintrouvables/denied-refusees-e.html
152
See http://www.cb-cda.gc.ca/unlocatable-introuvables/brochure2-e.html.
153
See 17 U.S.C. secs. 803(b)(3) (three-month voluntary negotiation period following
initiation of CRB rate-making proceeding); 805 (“General rule for voluntarily negotiated
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in several instances for antitrust exemptions to enable industry-wide
licensing negotiations; the compulsory licenses serve as back stops should
private ordering fail.154 The statute creates a Copyright Royalty Board to
set the rates; a CRB proceeding can be both lengthy and expensive.155 A
recent Copyright Office study acknowledges that “Proceedings may
involve numerous interested parties and often take two years or longer to
complete. The CRB process allows for significant discovery, including
document production and depositions, though it is not as broad as
discovery permitted under the Federal Rules. Trials before the CRB,
relatively formal in nature, typically involve multiple expert and nonexpert
witnesses and voluminous economic evidence, and can last several
weeks.”156 Moreover, since rates may require revision over time, the
statute also provides a schedule for revisiting prior rate settings.157
Compulsory licenses have been criticized as excessively cumbersome and
insufficiently responsive to technological and market evolutions.158

agreements”). Of the ratemakings published in the Federal Register (which include those
that settle and those that do not), nine have settled prior to the CRB's final independent
determination, while seven have not. (The CRB was created in 2004, and the first final
rule promulgated by the CRB was in 2007).
154
See id. § 114, 115(c)(3)(B), 116, 118; see also (describing inter-industry agreement
and settlement on § 115 rates).
155
See id. §. 803, 804 (setting out CRB proceedings in extensive detail). Regarding the
cost and duration of CRB proceeding, see, e.g. Determination of Rates and Terms for
Preexisting Subscription Services and Satellite Digital Audio Radio Services, concluded
Spring 2013. Music Choice's written statement alone in this case constituted 1,671 pages.
It is available at http://www.loc.gov/crb/proceedings/2011-1/. Sirius XM's statement in
the same proceeding was 1,689 pages. Copyright royalty hearings can involve extensive
expert testimony as well. In 2009's Mechanical and Digital Phonorecord Delivery Rate
Determination Proceeding, involved dozens of witnesses' testimony from three interested
parties at initial hearings and as part of rebuttal testimony; see 74 FR 6832 (Feb. 11,
2009), available at http://www.loc.gov/crb/fedreg/2009/74fr4510.pdf#page=2.
With respect to duration of a ratemaking proceeding, a contested ratemaking takes
roughly two years; ratemakings with early settlements usually take less time, often
around one year or even less. For the 2011 Determination of Rates and Terms for
Preexisting Subscription Services and Satellite Digital Audio Radio Services (section 114
ratesetting for 2013--17), the ratemaking commenced on January 5, 2011 with notice in
the Federal Register, and was concluded February 14, 2013.
156
Copyright Small Claims: A Report of the Register of Copyrights 63 (September
2013), available at http://www.copyright.gov/docs/smallclaims/
157
See, e.g., 17 USC sec. 801(b)(2) (adjustment of rates for cable retransmissions);
804(b)(4)("A petition described in subsection (a) to initiate proceedings under section
801(b)(1) concerning the adjustment or determination of royalty rates as provided in
section 115 may be filed in the year 2006 and in each subsequent fifth calendar year, or at
such other times as the parties have agreed under section 115(c)(3) (B) and (C).").
158
See, e.g., Robert Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94
Colum. L. Rev. 2655, 2669 (1994) (speculating that compulsory license regimes “may
prevent the creation of technological and organizational innovations that would
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2. The effect of eBay: Will failed fair use defenses yield only
monetary remedies (de facto permitted-but-paid)?
While statutory compulsory licenses govern only those situations
expressly designated by Congress, judge-made compulsory licenses (some
even authorized in the Copyright Act159) could introduce desirable
flexibility more broadly. The Ninth Circuit in Universal City Studios v.
Sony Corp. of America, having found the use of the videotape recorder to
record off-air television programming to infringe, posited a “continuing
royalty” in lieu of an injunction.160 (How judges would set the rate, and
whether undertaking such a task would be desirable is another matter.161)
Arguably, the Supreme Court’s ruling in eBay v MercExchange,
that irreparable harm should not be presumed upon proof of patent
infringement, will chasten judges in all intellectual property infringement
cases, and will lead to fewer grants of injunctive relief in copyright
infringement cases as well.162 Withholding injunctive relief would set the
stage for inter-party negotiations, though it could also considerably reduce
the bargaining power of the copyright owner who can no longer wield a
credible threat to compel the defendant to cease its activities.
A review of post eBay copyright cases, however, indicates that
denial of preliminary or permanent injunctive relief in copyright cases
falls far short of general or systematic.163 With respect to permanent
injunctions, only five of 23 cases studied through 2013 withheld injunctive
relief, despite plaintiff’s success on the merits, and with one exception,

effectively administer the rights-clearing process.”); Paul Goldstein, Copyright, Law &
Contemp. Probs. Spring 1992, at 79, 84.
159
17 U.S.C. sec 104A (d)(3)(B)
160
659 F.2d 963, 976 (9th Cir. 1981), rev.’d. 646 U.S. 417 (1984) (“when great public
injury would result from an injunction, a court could award damages or a continuing
royalty. This may very well be an acceptable resolution in this context.”)
161
Cf. Benjamin Petersen, Injunctive Relief in the Post eBay World, 23 Berkeley Tech.
L. J. 193 (2008) (surveying patent cases and contending that judicial rate-setting is
undesirable).
162
See, e.g., Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010) (reading eBay to apply to
copyright infringement cases; the case involved an unsuccessful fair use defense to the
publication of an unauthorized sequel to The Catcher in the Rye). For a critical view of
eBay and its likely impact in copyright cases, see, e.g., Mark P. Gergen, John M. Golden
& Henry E. Smith, The Supreme Court’s Accidental Revolution? The Test for
Permanent Injunctions, 112 Colum. L. Rev. 203 (2012).
163
See Jairui Liu, Copyright Injunctions After eBay: An Empirical Study, 16 Lewis &
Clark L. Rev. 215 (2012) (analyzing cases to 2010). For a review of post-eBay awards
(or withholding) of injunctive relief in intellectual property cases generally, through
2013, I thank Trey Brewer, Columbia Law School class of 2014.
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none involved a finding of likely future infringement.164 Regarding
preliminary injunctions, only three of ten decisions found a likelihood of
success on the merits, but declined to find sufficient irreparable harm to
warrant injunctive relief.165 Thus, looking to the courts to implement
Permitted but Paid by withholding injunctive relief to copyright owners
whose substantive claims have succeeded does not seem a likely course.
B.
How much can one achieve by private ordering without
legislation? Is court-ordered “license it or lose it” an answer?
On the other hand, the prospects may look different if the court
makes success on the merits turn on the offer of a license, as did the
district court in Cambridge University Press v. Georgia State
University.166 The impact on the copyright owner’s bargaining position
may be less substantial than first appears, at least where the plaintiff was
seeking to be paid for the use rather than to prevent it altogether, because a
defendant who declines a reasonable license may be subject to an award of
substantial statutory damages, as well as injunctive relief.167 But the
164

See Christopher Phelps & Associates, LLC v. Galloway, 492 F.3d 532 (4th Cir. 2007)
(Irreparable harm shown, as well as inadequacy of monetary damages, but balance of
hardship and public interest not proven); Magna-RX, Inc. v. Holley, CV05-3545-PHXEHC, 2008 WL 5068977 (D. Ariz. Nov. 25, 2008) (plaintiff failed to give any evidence
regarding irreparable harm, possibly in mistake belief that irreparable harm was
presumed after a finding of infringement); Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens Ltd. P'ship,
CIV.A. MJG-08-397, 2011 WL 5445947 (D. Md. Nov. 9, 2011) (no irreparable harm
shown because the logo which the Ravens unlawfully used had no commercial value
other than its use by the Ravens; the judge ordered the two parties to negotiate a licensing
agreement---the only post eBay copyright decision so far to have ordered negotiation);
Bean v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., CV 11-08028-PCT-FJM, 2012 WL 1078662 (D. Ariz.
Mar. 30, 2012) (no irreparable harm in this case because plaintiff---a photographer--could not prove the likelihood of future infringement. The books which unlawfully
contained his photographs were out of print); Brighton Collectibles, Inc. v. Pedre Watch
Co., Case No.: 11cv00637 AJB (WVG) (S.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2013) (no irreparable harm
because no proof of likely future infringement and inadequate proof of reputational
harm).
165
See, Bethesda Softworks, L.L.C. v. Interplay Entm't Corp., 452 F. App'x 351 (4th Cir.
2011) (district court was unconvinced by plaintiff’s showing of irreparable harm); Frerck
v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 850 F. Supp. 2d 889 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (photographer gave a
limited license to a textbook publisher to publish his photos; the terms of the license were
exceeded by the textbook publisher. Court found damages constituted sufficient relief in
light of industry practice of retroactive licenses covering uses not originally bargained or
paid-for): Grant Heilman Photography, Inc. v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 864 F. Supp. 2d
316 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (very similar to Frerck).
166
Supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text (analyzing the “license it or lose it”
approach of the Georgia State court).
167
Statutory damages are available if the work was registered with the Copyright Office
prior to its infringement, 17 U.S.C. sec. 412; professional publishers tend systematically
to register. Of course, no damages, statutory or actual, may be awarded against a state
entity, such as Georgia State University, see Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid

50

problem of assessing whether the license the plaintiff offered was
reasonable may thrust courts back into the rate-making business, to which
generalist federal judges may be less well-suited than the specialized
Copyright Royalty Board.
C.

Legislation to enable private ordering?

If full-blown administrative ratemaking is too expensive and takes
too long, but license-it-or-lose-it presents the problem of excessive judicial
intervention (or, conversely, for those judges disinclined to second-guess
proposed licensing fees, excessive deference to copyright owners),
perhaps a simplified ratemaking procedure could provide a happy
medium. In addition, the procedure should be designed to ensure that
authors share equally in the remuneration. I envision a combination of two
models, one based on voluntary negotiation of licenses, inspired by a
proposed amendment to section 114 of the copyright act’s provision on
compulsory licenses for non interactive digital transmission of sound
recordings;168 but backed up by Copyright Royalty Board-administered
last-best-offer, or “baseball,” arbitration. With respect to the latter
solution, it is necessary also to consider the institutional setting for the rate
determinations as well as the application of baseball arbitration to the
copyright context.
Finally, any provision for a “backstop” of
administrative ratemaking should also contain a “sunset” clause requiring
legislative renewal every five years (otherwise the ratemaking
authorization expires), in order to promote a transition to market licensing
in the event that changing conditions make such licensing feasible.
At the threshold, however, we need to identify the uses to which
the proposed regime would apply. Recalling our two categories of fair
uses which, I have contended, should not remain uncompensated, there are
non profit public library and educational uses which have in effect
benefitted from fair use as social subsidy. And there are uses, generally
massive in scope, for which market licensing solutions have not yet been
devised. Our review of comparative law reveals that remuneration
schemes involving voluntary or state-supported licensing mechanisms
generally correspond to these broad categories. But a principal difference
between the United States and most other countries studied is the
prevalence of collective licensing societies outside the US. Indeed, as the
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999) (Lanham Trademark Act); Fla.
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999)
(Patent Act).
168
H.R. 3219, 113th Cong. (2013-14) (“Free market royalty act”).
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French legislation on mass digitization of books illustrates,
implementation of the scheme required the creation of a collecting society
dedicated to administering the licenses.169 Apart from the fields of public
performance rights in non dramatic musical compositions, where ASCAP
and BMI collectively license users large and small (and operate under
antitrust consent decrees170), and, to a lesser extent, reprographic and
digital reproduction rights in books licensed by the Copyright Clearance
Center, collective management of authors’ rights is far less pervasive here
than in most other copyright-producing countries. As a result, unless new
collective management societies emerge, or unless the major rightholders
of particular kinds of repertory may combine without antitrust constraints
to offer licenses across the repertory,171 implementation of voluntary
licensing mechanisms is likely to encounter daunting transactions costs.
Moreover, where multiple users comprise the class of potential licensees it
may also be necessary to consider how the class may be represented in the
negotiations.172 State-supported backstops to voluntary licensing can of
course relieve the antitrust constraints on rate-setting (as is already the
case for certain compulsory licenses173), but those solutions take us out of
the realm of private ordering, and into legislation to establish an
administrative framework to offer a rate-setting mechanism that is faster,
cheaper, and, to the extent possible, closer to market solutions than the
current panoply of compulsory licenses affords.
1. H.R. 3219 “Free Market Royalty Act”

169

Supra Part II.C. Similarly, the rejected Google Books settlement would have created a
“Book Rights Registry” collecting society to grant licenses to digitize out of commerce
books and to distribute the collected monies to authors and publishers. The Authors Guild
v. Google Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 671-72 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
170
17 U.S.C. sec. 115(c)(3)(B).
171
See, e.g., Sound Exchange, a society representing sound recording producers and
performers, that collects and distributes the compulsory license royalty for non interactive
webcasting under sec. 114. See http://www.soundexchange.com/about/
172
For example, in setting the license fees for public performances of non dramatic
musical compositions by bars and restaurants, ASCAP and BMI negotiate with the
restaurateurs’ trade association, see, e.g., Legislative Information & Representation,
Minn.
Restaurant
Ass’n,
http://www.hospitalitymn.org/displaycommon.cfm?an=1&subarticlenbr=85#BMI
(last
visited Apr. 27, 2014) (noting that members of Minnesota Restaurant Association receive
BMI music license with discounted rates, though each member must still obtain
individual license). In the royalty negotiations for video-programing licenses, small cable
operators may designate a Bargaining Agent, see In re DIRECTV Sports Net Pittsburgh,
LLC v. Armstrong Utilities, Inc., CSR-8480-P (FCC, Aug. 31, 2011). discussed infra.
173
See supra note 155 and accompanying text (describing antitrust exemptions in extant
compulsory licesing regimes).
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In 1995 and again in 1998, Congress amended the copyright act to
implement a digital public performance right in sound recordings. The
legislation distinguished interactive from non interactive digital
transmissions, subjecting the latter to compulsory licensing. The regime
directed the equal division of the proceeds of the compulsory license
among record producers and performers.174 The statutory provisions also
permitted copyright owners and webcasters to reach private agreements on
license rates;175 as a result, many performers may not in fact receive an
equal share of the licensing revenues.176 An amendment proposed in
December 2013, the “free market royalty act,”177 would, among other

174

17 U.S.C. sec. 114(f),(g)(2); see generally Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright Legislation for
the “Digital Millennium”, 23 Colum.-VLA J. L. & Arts 137, 166-70(1999) (describing
and analyzing 1995 and 1998 amendments).
175
17 U.S.C. sec. 114(f)(3).
176
See Kristelia A. García, Private Copyright Reform 4 (GW Law School Public Law
and Legal Theory Paper No. 2013-121, 2013) (“These private content licensing
agreements circumvent both the statutory license and relevant collective rights
organization . . . and in so doing, . . . potentially alter the rights and entitlements of nonparties in several significant ways,” including “deny[ing] artist royalty payments to which
they are legally entitled.”); see also Ben Sisario, Sirius’s Move to Bypass a Royalty
Payment Clearinghouse Causes an Uproar, N.Y. Times (Nov. 6, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/07/business/media/siriuss-move-to-bypass-royaltyagency-causes-uproar.html (noting that private agreements “could result in less money
and more complications for artists,” largely due to a lack of clarity as to how the author
receives payment); Musicians’ Digital Performance Royalties at Risk, Future of Music
Coalition,
http://futureofmusic.org/blog/2011/10/28/musicians-digital-performanceroyalties-risk (last visited Apr. 27, 2014) (arguing that direct licenses can hurt performers
because they may not receive direct payments, could be paid less, will not be part of
negotiations, and could be forced to accept licenses allowing for more expansive use of
their music).
177
H.R. 3219 provides in relevant part:
(e) EFFICIENCY OF LICENSING.—
(1) COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATION FOR NON- INTERACTIVE SERVICES.—
Pursuant to section 106(6), and notwithstanding any other provision of law, any
noninteractive services performing sound recordings publicly by means of an audio
transmission may collectively negotiate and agree to royalty rates and license
terms and conditions for the performance of such sound recordings.
(2) ONE-STOP LICENSING FOR NONINTERACTIVE SERVICES.—
(A) NEGOTIATION OF LICENSES BY COMMON AGENT.—Pursuant to section
106(6), and notwithstanding any other provision of law, for licenses for
noninteractive audio transmissions, SoundExchange, Inc., or any successor entity is
designated as the sole common agent to negotiate, agree to, pay, and receive
payments under this section. If a license for noninteractive audio transmissions is
agreed to by such common agent, copyright owners of sound recordings may
subsequently negotiate and agree to royalty rates and license terms and conditions
with any noninteractive services performing sound recordings publicly by means of an
audio transmission for the performance of such sound recordings.
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things, replace the current compulsory license regime for non interactive
digital transmissions with licenses covering digital negotiated between a
“common agent” representing the copyright owners (currently Sound
Exchange) and a collective representative of the webcasters. The
negotiations would proceed “notwithstanding any other provision of law,”
and therefore would be exempt from antitrust constraints. The amendment
preserves current section 114’s even division of the proceeds of the license
between producers and performers, but importantly makes the performers’
share mandatory by requiring that the webcaster pay the common agent
50% of the royalties the webcaster owes under the license, and further
instructing that the common agent “shall distribute” those payments to the
performers.
The proposed amendment also establishes a compulsory license
“backstop for public and non commercial stations” in the event that
(B) DIRECT PAYMENT AND EQUAL COMPENSATION.—The common agent
under sub-paragraph (A) shall make distributions directly to the following
recipients from payments collected under this section as follows:
(i) 50 percent shall be paid to the copyright owner.
(ii) 45 percent shall be paid to featured recording artists.
(iii) 5 percent shall be paid to nonfeatured musicians and vocalists (through the
American Federation of Musicians and Screen Actors Guild-American Federation of
Television and Radio Artists Intellectual Property Rights Distribution Fund, or their
successors).
(f) PAYMENTS FROM INDIVIDUAL LICENSES FOR NONINTERACTIVE
AUDIO TRANSMISSIONS.—In the case of a license granted by the copyright
owner of a sound recording to a noninteractive service performing sound recordings
publicly by means of an audio transmission, such service shall pay to the common
agent described in subsection (e) receipts from the licensing of such transmissions
in an amount equal to 50 percent of the total royalties and other compensation
that the service is required to pay for such transmissions under the applicable license
agreement. Such common agent shall distribute such payments in proportion to the
distributions provided in clauses (ii) and (iii) of subsection (e)(2)(B), and such
payments shall be the sole payments to which featured and nonfeatured artists are
entitled by reason of such transmissions under the license with that service.
(g) BACKSTOP FOR PUBLIC AND NONCOMMERCIAL STATIONS.—
(1) ESTABLISHMENT OF RATES AND TERMS.— If royalty rates and license terms
and conditions for the audio transmission or retransmission of a non-subscription
broadcast consisting solely of non-commercial educational and cultural radio
programs are not negotiated and agreed upon collectively under subsection (e)
between the common agent and a noncommercial educational broadcast station funded
on or after January 1, 1995, under section 396(k) of the Communications Act of
1934 (47 U.S.C. 396(k)), a proceeding under chapter 8 of this title shall determine the
rates and terms for such transmissions and retransmissions. The Copyright Royalty
Judges shall establish such rates and terms that most clearly represent the rates and
terms that would have been negotiated in the marketplace between a willing buyer
and a willing seller. In determining such rates and terms, the Copyright Royalty
Judges shall base their decision on economic, competitive, and programming
information presented by the parties.
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royalty rates and license terms “are not negotiated and agreed upon
collectively under subsection (e) between the common agent and a
noncommercial educational broadcast station . . .” In that case, the
Copyright Royalty Board will set rates that are supposed to emulate
willing buyer-seller marketplace rates, but one may suppose that the
failure of the parties to agree on a license means that the rates are likely to
fall short of true market rates. The proposed amendment does not specify
whether the CRB-designated royalty will be shared equally among
producers and performers, but that may be implicit.
The “free market royalty act” offers an attractive template for
Permitted but Paid licenses. By suspending antitrust constraints, and by
encouraging the development of a user-side collective complement to the
copyright interests’ “common agent,” the bill would stimulate bilateral
industry-wide agreements, thus reducing transaction costs. Were this
approach to be generalized to sectors in which copyright owner-author
common agents are less prevalent (or non existent) it would be necessary
to foster the creation of such bargaining entities. The mandatory set-aside
for creators is another very appealing feature.
But what if the collective representatives fail to agree? Should the
“backstop” measures of the “free market royalty act” also be generalized,
not only to non commercial users (subsidy uses), such as non profit
libraries and educational institutions, but to all? Is it justified to extend the
“backstop” to commercial users if the basis of their “Permitted but Paid”
license is market failure, given that an amendment inspired by the “Free
Market Royalty Act” would make bargaining easier by allowing the
aggregation of owners and users and negotiation through respective
representatives? If these devices effectively cure market failures, then a
compulsory license backstop would not be warranted. Moreover, were
compulsory licensing an option should negotiations fail, actors who
believe they have more to gain from a compulsory license regime than
from a negotiated license might not bargain in good faith. Finally, a CRB
proceeding is currently both expensive and time-consuming.178
Accordingly, whomever the beneficiaries of compulsory license fall-back,
the current regime might also warrant some modifications. The technique
of last best-offer arbitration might prove adaptable to the task.
2.

178

Baseball Arbitration: Institutional Constraints

See supra notes 153—55 and accompanying text.
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Before addressing how a last-best-offer “backstop” would apply to
copyright licenses, it is necessary to confront possible constraints on
Congress’ power to amend the Copyright Act to compel the parties to
submit to binding arbitration.
The Copyright Royalty Board is an arm of the Copyright Office,
which is a branch of the Library of Congress. The CRB already is
empowered to set rates for the various compulsory licenses set out in the
copyright act; the proposed scheme, albeit what one might call
“ratemaking light,” seems well within the Board’s attributions. Because
copyright is federal statutory subject matter, and “the claim at issue
derives from a federal regulatory scheme,”179 copyright claims can
reasonably be described as claims involving “public rights” suitable for
With respect to the
adjudication by non-Article III tribunals.180
appointments clause, CRB judges have already been held “inferior
officers” terminable at will by their “head of department” (in this case, the
Librarian of Congress), and therefore their appointments do not violate
separation of powers.181
Because the proposed regime relies on binding and compulsory
arbitration, the scheme exceeds the bounds imposed by the Administrative
Procedure Act. Without an amendment to the Copyright Act to mandate
arbitration in relevant cases, the Library of Congress’ power to administer
arbitrations would be limited to what the APA allows: all arbitrations
would require the consent of both parties, the arbitrators would be agreed

179

Stern v. Marshall, 131 S.Ct. 2594 (2011) characterizing public rights cases as “cases
in which the claim at issue derives from a federal regulatory scheme, or in which
resolution of the claim by an expert government agency is deemed essential to a limited
regulatory objective within the agency's authority.” 131 S.Ct. at 2613.
180
Cf. Report of the Register of Copyright, Copyright Small Claims, supra, at 40--41
(“Because the rights and remedies for copyright are fixed by Congress pursuant to an
overarching statutory scheme . . . at least some types of small copyright claims should be
amenable to non-Article III resolution.”). The Supreme Court’s decisions in Thomas v.
Union Carbide, 473 U.S. 568 (1985) and Stern v. Marshall, 131 S.Ct. 2594 (2011)
suggest that a copyright licensing dispute would be properly cast as a public rights case,
and that agency-administered arbitration would be appropriate. Indeed, the particular
statute in question in Thomas v. Union Carbide involved the constitutionality of a
Congressional statute which selected binding arbitration (with limited judicial review) as
the means for dispute resolution for participants in a federal pesticide registration
scheme. 473 U.S. at 573-75.
181
Intercollegiate Broadcasting System v. Copyright Royalty Board, 684 F.3d 1332 (D.C.
Cir. 2012), following Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB, 130 S.Ct. 3138 (2010), which
barred “double for-cause removal.”
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upon by both parties, and the parties would have to agree on all issues
submitted to the arbitrator.182
By contrast, specific statutory provisions can confer the requisite
authority. For example the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and the
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act allow for the FCC and Department of the
Interior, respectively, to authorize arbitration upon the request of only one
party during negotiations.183 The statute does not need to specify the type
of arbitration used by the agency; the agency is at liberty to promulgate
rules developing its own procedures for arbitration. For example, FCC
rules promulgated pursuant to the Telecommunications Act instruct that
“An arbitrator, acting pursuant to the Commission's authority under
section 252(e)(5) of the Act, shall use final offer arbitration,” subject to
carefully delineated exceptions.184
2.

How Baseball Arbitration Could Apply to “Permitted but Paid”

To assess how a baseball arbitration fall-back could apply to a
“permitted but paid” regime in copyright law, it may help to look to
experience in the Federal Communications Commission. The FCC
context admittedly differs from the licenses posited here, because the FCC
has employed baseball arbitration as a condition on authorizing the merger
of cable operators: when the merger would otherwise result in conferring
182

See 5 U.S.C. Sec. 575(a)(1) (decision to arbitrate must be voluntary on the part of all
parties to the arbitration; Sec. 575(a)(1)(A) and (B) (any party can limit the issues it
agrees to submit to arbitration; this could mean that a party may refuse to arbitrate unless
the decision is limited to a range of outcomes); Sec. 577(a) (the parties to an arbitration
are entitled to participate in selecting an arbitrator; this could result in naming arbitrators
who are not CRB judges).
183
See 47 U.S.C. § 252(b); 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iv).
184
47 C.F.R. § 51.807.
In 2001, the Senate proposed amending title 49 of the United States Code to authorize the
Secretary of Transportation to mandate baseball-style arbitration in the case of labor
disputes between an air carrier and its employees---the Secretary could forestall a strike
by compelling the parties to submit to binding baseball-style arbitration. See Airline
Labor Dispute Resolution Act of 2001, S. 1327, 107th Cong. (2001). This bill ultimately
died in committee.
Finally, the timing of the arbitration may carry Seventh Amendment implications. If a
copyright holder and would-be licensee fail to agree voluntarily upon a price for a
license, but seek administrative dispute resolution in lieu of initiating an infringement
action, there would appear to be no constitutional impediment to pursuing an
administrative remedy. If, however, arbitration were sought after the filing of an
infringement action, the Supreme Court’s decision in Feltner v. Columbia Pictures
Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340 (1997), that litigants in a copyright dispute are entitled to a
trial by jury, even when statutory damages (a seemingly “public” right conferred by
Congress) are the only damages sought, might entitle either party to resist the
administrative procedure on the ground that the court action triggers that party’s right not
only to a judicial rather than administrative remedy, but to a jury trial as well.
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too much power over video programming, the operator must license the
programming to local carriers at a reasonable rate. Baseball arbitration
provides the means by which the FCC sets that rate.
If the contexts are by no means identical, they are arguably
analogous: the impetus for U.S. courts to find fair use in many of the
social subsidy or market failure contexts for which licensing mechanisms
exist in other countries is to prevent the copyright law from conferring
power over content to the unreasonable prejudice of certain public services
or technological advances. (Because the essence of copyright - as a
property right - is control over the exploitations comprised within the
statutory exclusive rights, the author’s or rightholder’s control over
content remains in most cases the appropriate objective of the copyright
system; the prejudice that a mandatory arbitration system offsets must
therefore be unreasonable.)
A fundamental principle behind baseball-style arbitration is to
encourage private ordering and incentivize settlement. By requiring the
arbitrator to select one of two proposed offers, baseball arbitration urges
the parties to avoid extremes by confronting them with the risk that the
arbitrator will accept the other party’s offer. The academic literature
differs on whether baseball-style arbitration does successfully push parties
toward more “reasonable” offers, though what empirical data there is
seems to suggest that offers do converge.185
In addition, this arbitration mechanism could at least in part avoid
the extensive economic and market analysis required in “willing
buyer/willing seller” ratemaking in order to determine the proper market
rate. “Willing buyer/willing seller” ratemaking, as currently administered
by the Copyright Royalty Judges, involves presentation of written and
testimonial direct evidence and rebuttal testimony, legal briefing,
185

Academic studies of final-offer arbitration in the context of public-sector union
negotiations indicate that the procedure does indeed encourage settlement. See Elissa A.
Meth, Note, Final Offer Arbitration: A Model for Dispute Resolution In Domestic and
International Disputes, 10 Am. Rev. Int'l Arb. 383 (1998). For the original baseball
context, see Jonathan M. Conti, The Effect of Salary Arbitration on Major League
Baseball, 5 Sports Law. J. 221, 232—34 (1998) (suggesting that MLB’s arbitration
procedure has “achieved its goal” of “getting the parties to either settle their cases prior to
arbitration, or at least to submit figures that are within the same ballpark.”). Josh
Chetwynd notes that while labor relations theorists endorse the view that final-offer
arbitration encourages convergence in the parties’ proposals, decision scientists often
disagree. Josh Chetwynd, Play Ball? An Analysis of Final-Offer Arbitration, Its Use in
Major League Baseball and Its Potential Applicability to European Football Wage and
Transfer Disputes, 20 Marq. Sports L. Rev. 109, 116 (2009). Chetwynd acknowledges,
however, that “empirical data had indicated that convergence was often occurring.” Id.
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arguments of counsel, and judicial review.186 As a result, the most recent
ratemaking took over five years from the initial notice-and-comment
period until the Judges’ final determination.187
Admittedly, some final-offer arbitration mechanisms are similarly
expensive and time-consuming. For example, the FCC proceedings
described above often produce large expenses for both parties arbitrating,
and though it is supposed to take place over a short period of time (30
days from notice to arbitration decision, and then 30 days for a decision
from the FCC, if a party appeals), parties are allowed to alter the time
limits as they see fit.188 Others, such as the procedure in Major League
Baseball, are relatively speedy and efficient.189
Another issue concerns disparities in bargaining power. Finaloffer arbitration appears to diminish parties’ inherent bargaining disparity
in the baseball context, as well as in the case of public-sector employee
unions. In Major League Baseball, one recent study indicated that the
players (the labor side) were successful in 42% of arbitration proceedings
that went to a final hearing.190 For public-sector unions, one study
examined New Jersey cases and found the party with weaker bargaining
power---the unions---won roughly two-thirds of the time.191 This evidence
186

See Determination of Royalty Rates for Digital Performance Right in Sound
Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, 79 Fed. Reg. 23,102, 23,103 (April 25, 2014).
187
Id. at 23,102.
188
FCC, Memorandum Opinion and Order, In the Matter of Applications of Comcast
Corporation, General Electric Company and NBC Universal, Inc. For Consent to Assign
Licenses and Transfer Control of Licensees (Jan. 20, 2011), app. A at 129 (“The parties
may agree to modify any of the time limits set forth[in the arbitration rules] . . . .”).
189
See Jonathan M. Conti, The Effect of Salary Arbitration on Major League Baseball, 5
Sports Law. J. 221, 228-29 (1998) (describing annual two-month window for arbitration
proceedings in Major League Baseball).
190
Amy Farmer et. al., The Causes of Bargaining Failure: Evidence from Major League
Baseball, 47 J.L. & Econ. 543, 562 (2004). However, that author attributes these
outcomes to the players being less risk-averse than owners in such negotiations, and
consequently more often on the losing side, see id. at 562 (“We find that players tend to
exhibit greater aggression than clubs and that ultimately players fare worse when their
aggression leads them to arbitration. Our evidence also suggests that players learn,
because previously eligible players fare slightly better than do those in first-time
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suggests that parties in a relatively weak bargaining position can
nevertheless succeed in baseball—style arbitration simply by avoiding risk
and submitting reasonable bids. Moreover, designation of a “common
agent” to represent a group of weaker parties may further reduce the
bargaining disparities.
Conclusion
Fair use has gone off the rails with the transformation of
"transformative use" from a factor fostering new creativity to one favoring
new copyright-dependent business models and socially beneficent
reiterative uses. We should cease muddling authorship-grounded fair uses
with judge-made exceptions whose impetus derives from distinct
considerations. I have, moreover, suggested that those exceptions should
not always produce free passes. Instead, I have proposed a middle ground:
many of the current social subsidy fair uses and market failure fair uses
should be "permitted but paid."
This article has recommended
implementing that proposal through statutorily-facilitated bargaining
between agents representing copyright owners and users, backed up by
last best-offer arbitration before the Copyright Royalty Board. Whichever
method employed to set the rates for Permitted but Paid uses, the
copyright law should ensure that authors share in any statutory or
privately-ordered remuneration scheme. Were “Permitted but Paid” an
option, we would not be lured by a dichotomy falsely pitting authors
against a perceived social good: The licensing mechanism would allow
both broader dissemination and provide payment to authors. For many
redistributive uses, “Permitted but Paid” should replace fair use for free.

decreased from over 2% to less than 1% over a period of roughly 20 years, suggesting
that parties do indeed converge on offers over time.
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